A

FREE AND CANDID

REVIEW,

OF A

TRACT,

ENTITLED,

"*Observations on the Commerce of*
"*the American States;*"

SHEWING

The PERNICIOUS CONSEQUENCES, both to GREAT BRITAIN, and to the BRITISH SUGAR ISLANDS, of the Syſtems recommended in THAT TRACT.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. and W. LOWNDES, FLEET-STREET.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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REVIEW, &c.

THERE is no perſon of common underſtanding in this country, who will not readily admit that *Great Britain* is very much indebted to the *Navigation Act* for that grandeur of naval power, to which ſhe has attained within the preſent century. Yet not to that Act *alone* is ſhe indebted; but to the vaſt progreſſive improvements of her territorial agriculture and manufactures, the two great founders and employers of *ſhipping*.

At the period when that Act was paſſed by the *Long Parliament*, the Britiſh ſettlements in the *Weſt Indies*, and on the *American* continent, were already grown into

ſome importance: and whilſt this kingdom was involved in civil diſſentions, the *Dutch* found opportunity to monopolize the whole buſineſs of ſupplying our Coloniſts, in both places, with *European* goods; and of carrying away to Europe their products in return. The Act was paſſed; the Dutch were excluded; and that buſineſs devolved into the hands of its lawful owners, the *Engliſh*, and has ſo continued down to the preſent time.

The *principle* of this Act I take to be, "That no commodities ſhall be carried to "or from the *Britiſh* Colonies in a *foreign*, "which can, with equal conveniency and "practicability, be carried in a *Britiſh* "*bottom*, navigated by three-fourths *Bri-*"*tiſh* ſeamen." *Plantation-built* veſſels were declared to be *Britiſh*, within the meaning of the Act.

At the period of which I am ſpeaking, the *Continental Coloniſts* were already in the habit of ſupplying *Barbadoes*, and ſuch other places in the Weſt Indies as we then occupied, with boards, ſtaves, heading, ſhingles, houſe and mill frames, fiſh, live-ſtock, flour, bread, and peaſe; a buſineſs

to

to which Nature herſelf ſeemed to have peculiarly fitted them, by their commodious ſituation: and it is to this neighbourly ſupply, continued during one hundred and thirty years, or upwards, that our Weſt India plantations in a great meaſure owe their eſtabliſhment: inſomuch that it is a very doubtful point, whether, if the Continent had been wholly in the hands of a foreign power, and the Engliſh abſolutely precluded from all commerce or intercourſe with it,—I ſay, it is a very doubtful point, whether, in ſuch caſe, we ſhould at this hour have poſſeſſed a ſingle acre of land in the Weſt Indies. In proportion, therefore, as long habitude and local exigencies have made thoſe continental ſettlements neceſſary to the inſular ones lying within the tropics, ſo muſt a divulſion of the one from the other be ſeverely injurious to our Weſt India Coloniſts.

It is not that the particular intereſt of our Sugar Iſlands is to be at all brought into *competition* with the welfare of Great Britain; it is impoſſible for ſuch a competition to happen. The partial convenience of the colony muſt, whenever the national welfare actually requires it, bend to *that*.

But they are embarqued together; and the parts, however ſmall, are parts of *one whole*. We are all equally the citizens of one and the ſame great metropolis. It is malice, pride, ignorance, or folly, alone, that can ſeek to make diſtinctions between them. There is no honeſt Britiſh citizen, I think, let his reſidence be where it will, who does not moſt cordially deſire to ſee the *principle* of our Act of Navigation cheriſhed and maintained as effectually as in reaſon and practicability it can or ought to be.

But if we ſay that in no degree, in no caſe, in no expediency whatever, it can or ought to be *relaxed*,—this is rather digreſſing beyond reaſon and public utility, and contrary to our own repeated practice. In the caſe of our *Weſt India Staples*, it has been moſt materially relaxed. Under the original ſtate of this *principle*, neither *foreign* coffee, cotton, indigo, nor tobacco could be imported hither, except ſubject to very diſcouraging reſtrictions. Theſe reſtrictions, however, have been one after another removed; and in regard to the three laſt-mentioned articles, they are *now* admitted

admitted into this kingdom in *foreign* as freely as in *Britiſh* ſhipping.

The moſt frantic affection any Britiſh ſubject may feel for the employment of *Britiſh vehicles*, and none other, in every the minuteſt department of our trade, cannot exceed the jealouſy of *Spain*: yet the Spaniſh governors, in the Weſt Indies, have frequently admitted ſupplies of flour and bread into their ports, in *foreign* ſhipping. The French, no leſs tenacious than we are of the navigation *principle*, have nevertheleſs opened *free ports* long ago in their Iſlands, and permitted not only proviſions, but ſeveral *other articles*, to be introduced in *foreign* ſhipping, as neceſſary for the colony: yet France is far abler than we are to ſupply ſimilar articles from Europe. Britain, conforming to the ſame policy, alſo opened *free ports* in ſeveral of her Weſt India Iſlands; and, upon a plan not leſs liberal, excluding only the articles of foreign European product and manufacture, and certain enumerated articles of the Weſt India growth.

Theſe occaſional deviations from the ſuppoſed *principle* of the Navigation Act, moſt

clearly ſhew that the Britiſh legiſlature has been aware, that, by wiſely and ſeaſonably diſpenſing with a rigid adherence to it in ſome reſpects, its operation would be rendered more enlarged and beneficial in others: and this is a wiſe and warrantable policy. For it is equally politic and neceſſary ſometimes to obtain a *great good* by ſubmitting to a *little evil.*

In the caſe of our Iſlands, it muſt certainly appear much more for the advantage of *Britiſh* navigation, that the American reſources *(within proper limits)* ſhould ſtill continue open and acceſſible to them, than be withheld or impeded: for whenever their external ſupply ſhall be rendered exorbitantly dear, or in any degree precatious, they will undoubtedly betake themſelves to the cultivation of proviſions, and the hewing of ſtaves, inſtead of applying their attention and labour to the culture of *valuable* and *bulky ſtaples.* Theſe latter, together with the Britiſh ladings exported thither from Europe, and the African trade, combine to form the dignified maſs of ſupport, which our navigation derives from theſe ſettlements. And, compared

with this, ſo inconſiderable, ſo truly contemptible, is the trifling interference of American ſhallops carrying food to invigorate the hungry labourer, timber to repair mills and houſes, and packages for the crop, that I muſt own it ſeems not to be an object deſerving a moment's ſolicitude in the breaſt of a great nation.

What if the Britiſh inhabitants, upon the rock of *Gibraltar*, are fed by the *ſtates* of *Barbary* or *Morocco?* Shall *Britain* interpoſe her authority, and forbid any ſuccours of that nature to be carried to *Gibraltar*, except in *Britiſh* veſſels?—Are not ſome of our Weſt India Iſlands in much the *ſame* predicament with Gibraltar? *They are.* There are ſome of them which have not land to ſpare for proviſions, without throwing up a large quantity of their ſugar canes, or other ſtaples. Would this change tend to the *increaſe* of *Britiſh* ſhipping? Certainly not, but the very reverſe. The people would remain; but, in proportion as their ſtaple-culture is narrowed, they will conſume *leſs* value of *Britiſh* manufactures, becauſe they will have leſs

to buy them with; and, raiſing leſs produce, they will have leſs for *export*.

It is impoſſible that this great manufacture of ſugar can be carried on, any more than others, where the food of the manufacturers, and the neceſſaries required for it, are irregularly, dearly, precariouſly, or improperly ſupplied. Of the whole catalogue of tropical ſtaples, *ſugar* is the only one of which Great Britain now imports, of *her own* growth, *ſufficient* for her own conſumption. There were ſome others, which, by a more judicious management, ſhe might probably have retained. But *ſugar* is now the *only one* that is left; and for that very reaſon, and becauſe of its ineſtimable value to her, as a naval and commercial power, ſhe cannot be too careful, at *this criſis* in particular, when we are but juſt emerged from a ruinous war, not to throw any freſh diſcouragement upon the culture of it.

Let the diſpaſſionate legiſlator place *Nova Scotia* on the one hand, and our *Sugar Iſlands* on the other; let him weigh their relative importance to the *flag* of *this coun-*

try,

try, in a juſt ſcale; and then let him determine, if in conſcience he can, that the proſperity of the latter ſhould be ſacrificed to the riſing glories of *Port Roſway!*

But leſt ſome latent taint of prejudice ſhould lurk within his mind, imbibed from the lately publiſhed "*Obſervations* "*on the Commerce of the American States*," a tract which ſeems to derive its weight principally from the high rank and reſpectable name of its author, rather than from ſound reaſoning, or well-founded facts,—it may be proper to examine a little into the nature, ſituation, and *capabilities* of our three Northern ſettlements, which the noble author ſo ardently patronizes. It is from an attentive inveſtigation of their *natural* advantages and defects, that we can alone be duly qualified to judge either of their *future* utility to the nation, or their *preſent* and *future* capacity for occupying that void in the commerce of our Sugar Iſlands, which the revolt of our former Northern provinces has occaſioned. To begin therefore with

CANADA.

CANADA.

THE deſcriptions which are given of any country, either by natives of it, or by patentees, or proprietors, whoſe partiality or whoſe ſelf-intereſt incline them to deception, are moſt commonly fictitious, and very little deſerving of confidence. There are none upon whoſe fidelity we can ſo ſafely rely as *naturaliſts*; whoſe thirſt of ſcience may have led them to explore diſtant regions. Whatever relates to climate and productions, is, to the naturaliſt, one of the chief objects of enquiry; ſuch men are therefore, in general, the beſt qualified to decide with preciſion, and report with truth.

Profeſſor Kalm, a Swede, and the learned pupil of *Linnæus*, ſpent ſome time in this province; and from the obſervations which that gentleman collected here, we have convincing evidence of the rigour of the climate, and how ill adapted it is to become a granary for the Weſt Indies, or indeed

deed to ſupport a due communication with it.

The river St. Lawrence meaſures exactly three quarters of a mile acroſs at Quebec; but notwithſtanding its breadth, and the impetuoſity of its current (the difference between high and low water being generally no leſs than from *ſixteen* to *eighteen* feet) it is covered with ice during the whole winter; during which time carriages may paſs over it in ſafety. It is ſaid to happen *frequently*, that, when the river has been open in *May*, the nights are ſo cold that it freezes again, and will bear walking over. This circumſtance, he adds, is a clear proof of the intenſeneſs of the froſt; eſpecially when one conſiders the extraordinary riſe and fall of the water, on the ebb and flow of the tide, in this river. From the journal of Monſ. *Gaultier* (*Regius* Phyſician at Quebec) it appears, that in the month of *March*, after the mildeſt winter ever known, the ſnow at that city was *only two feet* in depth, and the *ice* of the river below was of the *ſame* thickneſs. 'On the 3d of *May* the cold

was

was ſo intenſe, that *Celſius*'s (or the Swediſh) thermometer was at four degrees *beneath* the freezing point. It was regarded as a rare phenomenon, that the ice ſhould break at Quebec ſo early as on the 20th of *April*, becauſe the river is ſometimes incruſted with it in the middle of *May* *.

The town of Montreal lying near two hundred miles to the ſouthward of Quebec, we might naturally expect to find its climate much leſs intemperate; and, in fact, the difference between them is ſaid to be very great, and the winter neither ſo early nor *quite* ſo cold. Yet, even in this more temperate ſituation, the river is often frozen to the thickneſs of *two French feet* (about 25½ inches Engliſh); and from Mr. *Barr*'s journal of the weather at this place, in the year 1777, we learn that, notwithſtanding the winter had been unuſually mild, the thermometer was, on the

* An Engliſh gentleman, who arrived laſt year from this part of the globe, in anſwer to ſome queſtions about the climate, ſummed up its character very laconically in theſe words: "*Eight* months of *froſt*, and *four* months *bad weather*."

laſt

laſt day of *March*, 34 *degr.* below 0, or 66 degr. *below* the *freezing point* *.

The diſtance of Quebec from the ſea is computed at about 360 miles; and not only in this, but in the upper range of the river St. Lawrence, the navigation is one of the moſt arduous and dangerous in the whole world. For to begin with it at Lake *Ontario*:—Between this lake and Montreal, the Indian traders meet with no leſs than ſix cataracts, which oblige them to unload their canoes, and convey both theſe and their cargoes a conſiderable way over land. From Montreal to Quebec the depth of water is barely practicable for veſſels of 300 tons burthen; but theſe are frequently impeded by terrible winds, which detain them a fortnight or three weeks in this ſhort paſſage. From Quebec to the ſea, the dangers are multiplied by the quantities of ice which ſhut it up during ſix or eight months in the year, by the rapidity and ſtrength of its current, by thick fogs and exhalations which brood over it dur-

* Publiſhed in the *Philoſ. Tranſ.*—I am ſorry this gentleman has not favoured the public with a continuation of his diary through the ſucceeding months.

ing

ing the remainder, and by a vaſt number of ſhoals, moveable ſand-banks, and concealed rocks, which render it impaſſable in the night time, and even extremely hazardous by day-light. In ſhort, from the month of September or October to June, the whole channel, from Quebec to *Cape Canſo*, in *Nova Scotia*, becomes a kind of *mare clauſum*, more or leſs obſtructed with ice, and conſequently either unnavigable, or exceedingly perilous.

Enſign *Prenties* of the 84th regiment (who was wrecked, and nearly famiſhed, on the iſle of Cape Breton, in the year 1780) aſſerts that, even on the 25th of *April*, the quantities of drifting ice were ſo great between *Iſle Madame* and *Nova Scotia*, that he could not, with any ſafety, purſue his route to *Canſo* and *Halifax*. It is manifeſt then, beyond contradiction, that it is only for four, or at moſt five months in the year, the navigation between Canada and the Weſt Indies is tolerably open; that at all times it is dangerous; that only one voyage between thoſe places can be made in the courſe of one year; and that ſuch voyage, either

going

going or returning, muſt be made in the *hurricane ſeaſon*, and cannot be made in any other.

Our planters then will argue, and with much propriety on their ſide, that a conſtant, regular intercourſe with Canada and St. John's Iſland, ſuch as is unavoidably neceſſary where proviſions, and other commodities of a periſhable quality, are the principal ſupplies propoſed to be obtained by ſuch a commerce, is *naturally impoſſible*; that a navigation ſo uncommonly interrupted and unſafe muſt be attended with inconvenient delays, conſtant riſque, frequent damage, and heavy loſſes; whoſe certain concomitants will be very extravagant rates of freight and inſurance, and an increaſed price of the commodities interchanged. In anſwer to all this, we ſhall probably be told, that ſo far as regards the *phyſical* maladies of climate, we are to *hope* that in *proceſs of time*, when the atmoſphere of theſe regions ſhall be more impregnated with phlogiſtic particles from myriads of reeking dunghills, from the fumes of furnaces, from the fires and ſmoke of ten thouſand crowded cities *hereafter*

after to be built, and by a general ſubjection of the ſoil to agriculture, carried on to the Arctic Circle, they may be conſiderably alleviated.

But to ſhew how very unreaſonable ſuch expectations are, and how impoſſible it is for this climate to change by any other means than the earth's changing the poſition of its *axes*, let it be obſerved, that "* the land of North America, in all pro- "bability, reaches very near to the North "Pole; and that in theſe parts it conſiſts "of one entire groupe of high mountains, "covered with ſnow, or rather with ice, "throughout the whole year. A ridge "of mountains riſes at Cape Tourmente, "near Quebec, which continues from "four to five hundred leagues, forming "the greateſt congeries of the kind in the "univerſe, and ſpreading over all the Nor- "thern parts of that continent. Theſe "are what are called the *Northern Snowy* "*Mountains*, which extend to the 43d "*degree* of N. latitude, and render the

* Preſent State of Great Britain and North America, 1767; p. 257.

"whole

" whole of the country lying *north of that* " *latitude unfit* for *agriculture*.

" The river St. Lawrence is only a large " arm of the ſea, which runs up between " theſe mountains, as Hudſon's and Baf- " fin's bays do in the north, in order to " carry off the ſnow waters. All the " tracts which lie within the verge of theſe " mountains, or *north of New England*, are " perpetually involved in froſts, ſnows, or " thick fogs; and the colds which are " felt in the ſouth proceed from theſe " frozen regions by violent *north-weſt* " winds: theſe are the peculiar winds of " that continent, and blow with a fury " which none other exceeds. The great " lakes of Canada, which are rather ſo " many inland *ſeas*, extending north-weſt " for 12 or 1300 miles, give force and " direction to theſe ſtorms, which come " from regions ſtill more northern, and " bring the climate of Hudſon's Bay to the " moſt ſouthern parts of that continent " whenever they blow for any length of " time."

Such is the influence of the *north-weſt* wind:—but there is another bluſtering

tyrant of this atmoſphere, which, in the noxious effects of its blaſt, ſeems to reſemble the *Samiel* of Aſia, and the *Harmattan* of Afric, this is, the *north-eaſt* wind. "It is reckoned *here*, (at *Quebec*) ſays * *Kalm*, the moſt piercing of "all: perſons of the beſt credit here aſ-"ſure me, that this wind, when it is "very violent in winter, even penetrates "through *walls* of a moderate thickneſs; "inſomuch, that on the inſide of the "houſe they are coated over with ſnow, "or a thick hoar froſt; and a candle placed "near a thinner wall is almoſt extin-"guiſhed by the blaſt which continually "pervades it. The houſes (which are built "of *ſtone*) are ſo damaged by this wind, "that the owners are obliged very fre-"quently to repair them on the *north-eaſt* "ſide.

"† The cold, even at the city of *New* "*York*, is *twenty* degrees greater than the "moſt intenſe cold felt in England dur-"ing the hard winter of 1740. By the

* Vol. iii. p. 152.

† Preſent State, p. 166.

"obſervations

" obſervations made in January, 1765,
" by the maſters of the college at New
" York, Fahrenheit's thermometer fell *ſix*
" *degrees* below 0, which is 21 degrees be-
" low 15, the *greateſt* cold felt in *England*.
" In the inland parts, they have froſts the
" whole year, even in the middle of ſum-
" mer; which have been obſerved by
" many in the month of July, upon the
" mountains in the moſt ſouthern parts
" of Pennſylvania, and even on the moun-
" tains of Virginia, although they are but
" very low. * Even *wheat*, that hardy and
" almoſt univerſal grower, will not thrive
" in *New England*.

" Thoſe colds are ſo far from being oc-
" caſioned by the *woods*, that one half of
" that continent, which is the *coldeſt* part
" of it, and from which they proceed, *has*
" *not a wood in it*, and is ſo barren, that
" it does not bear a tree nor a buſh. It
" is from this *want of woods* in the *northern*
" parts, and the vaſt lakes, that theſe fu-
" rious winds are generated; which (if
" there were woods) might be conſider-
" ably abated. In the woods theſe cold

* Polit. Eſſ. 1772, p. 229.

 " winds

" winds may be endured, but in the *open* " *country* they are inſufferable either by " man or beaſt; and that, even in the " *ſouthern* provinces. *Hence*, if *all the* " *woods in that continent were cleared, Ca-* " *nada and Nova Scotia would be as unin-* " *habitable as Hudſon's Bay*, the northern " provinces as cold as *Canada*, and the ad- " jacent ſouthern provinces in the ſitua- " tion of the northern.

" Let us not deceive ourſelves, there- " fore, with the vain hope of *mending* " *nature*, and abating the rigour of theſe " inhoſpitable climes *." Theſe facts, ſuperior to the moſt plauſible theory, will convince every perſon, who is not harden- ed in prejudice, that neither the induſtry of man, nor the progreſs of ages, can repeal the irrevocable decrees of nature, who has doomed this country to perpetual ſterility. But it is † inſiſted, in contradiction to facts and experience, that *Canada* poſſeſſes, or *may ſoon* poſſeſs, ample ſtores of *lumber* and *wheat-flour*. It is proper, therefore,

* Preſent State, p. 257.

† Obſervations on the Commerce of the American States, p. 65, 68, et paſſim.

to

to diſcuſs theſe pretenſions, and oppoſe ſolid teſtimony to vague and unfounded aſſertion.

Canadian Lumber.

Under the general head of *lumber*, we muſt comprehend the very important articles of *ſtaves* and *heading* for ſugar-hogſheads and rum-puncheons. If the noble Author means that we ſhould underſtand, by the word *lumber*, nothing more than pine or deal boards, and ſcantling, it will readily be granted him, that theſe may be obtained from ſuch northern provinces where ſcarcely any other tree will exiſt; yet even theſe are much inferior in ſolidity and duration to what are produced in the ſouthern diſtricts of the United States. But as we are now ſuppoſed to have under conſideration the more material ſupplies of ſtaves for the uſe of the ſugar iſlands, as indiſpenſably neceſſary for the package of their produce; and a want of which, by regular import, and in the fulleſt ſupply, would occaſion not only infinite hurt to the trade of thoſe iſlands

with the mother country, but large defalcations to the Britiſh revenue; we are bound to examine a little the abilities of this province, as to the commodity in queſtion, that we may be ſatisfied how far our Weſt India planters may ſecurely depend upon them.

There are ſeveral ſpecies of oak which flouriſh in different parts of this continent; but thoſe from which the ſtaves and heading before-mentioned are uſually cut, are diſtinguiſhed, among the dealers, by the names of the *white* and the *red* oak. In reference to theſe, Profeſſor * *Kalm* aſſerts, that within twenty or twenty-two miles north-weſt from Quebec, *no oak*, of *any ſpecies whatever*, can be made to vegetate: that in the vicinities of that town very little oak of any ſort is to be met with; and what few trees can be found there, are much too ſtunted and ſmall for commercial purpoſes. Large and vigorous trees of this claſs are perhaps not to be ſeen beyond the north latitude of 43 degrees; they diminiſh paſt that latitude to the latitude of 47, beyond

* Kalm, vol. iii.

which

which not any of the ſpecies will thrive on this continent †. The Canadian dealers were obliged, above thirty years ago, to fetch their oak timber from the *borders of New England*, in rafts, down the rivers adjacent to thoſe parts, and near lake *Saint Pierre*, which communicates with the river *Saint Lawrence* ‡. Another ſupply they procured, with a great deal of trouble, from the country which lies betwixt Montreal and Crown Point, on lake Champlin; but this latter oak was not eſteemed of equal goodneſs with the former, and the place of its growth was ſtill further diſtant.

It ſhould ſeem, then, from this account, that our Canadian brethren muſt be indebted, for *this* article, to the ſubjects of the United States, or elſe be unable to provide our ſugar iſlands with any that is of a merchantable quality. And if, upon enquiry, it ſhould be found that the *line of partition* (adjuſted by the late definitive treaty) which ſeparates the territory of the northern ſtates from Ca-

† Kalm, vol. iii.
‡ Idem

nada, hath excluded us from all further right of property in theſe oaken reſources, on the confines of *New England*, and the neighbourhood of lake Champlin, (as there is ſubſtantial ground to believe it hath) very unpleaſant inferences will follow. But our induſtrious Canadians, it may be ſaid, may ſtill find acceſs to them, —what they are too indigent to buy, they may not be too conſcientious *to ſteal*, or (if they *feel bold* enough) to ſeize by force of arms: the object will be inviting to them, and a monopoly of our Weſt India markets cannot fail of operating as a *bounty* to encourage their rapine. Theſe outrages will embroil them with the ſtates of New England, and their confederates;—*we* muſt protect *our* ſubjects;—and thus the ſeeds of a *new war* may be ſown in a part of that continent, where no other ſeeds are half ſo likely to quicken, and to ſpread.

As it is, therefore, extremely problematical, whether our Canadians are really in poſſeſſion of the materials adapted to Weſt India commerce; we are ſure that Britiſh Miniſters will, on the one hand,

be

be cautious how they commit the valuable products of our ſugar iſlands upon this *uncertainty*; and on the other, they will not raſhly lend their hand to prompt *hoſtilities*, with which it cannot be for the advantage of Britain to entangle herſelf. In the article of *wheat-flour*, I fear we ſhall remark as capital a deficiency; and this ſhall be the ſubject of our next conſideration.

Canadian Corn and Flour.

The detail which has been given of the extraordinary duration of winter in this country, proceeding from cauſes in their nature unchangeable, is of itſelf a very rational demonſtration to prove its unfitneſs for the production of a *perfect* grain. *Wheat* will not proſper even in thoſe parts of New England which lie a great way to the ſouth-eaſt of Quebec; what hope then can we entertain of its proficiency in Canada, or at leaſt in that diſtrict of it which contains our preſent fellow-ſubjects, and with which only we can maintain, or are likely to maintain, any communication?

munication? We are credibly * aſſured, that in the diſtrict of Quebec three-fourths of the harveſt has hardly ever arrived at perfect maturity: for when the ſummer happens to be leſs warm, or the ſpring (if it deſerves the name) later than uſual, the greater part of their wheat is, by the abrupt return of cold weather, prevented from ripening.

The French ſettlers having found, by ſad experience, that the intenſe froſts of winter deſtroyed all the grain ſowed in autumn, changed their practice, and having procured ſeed of ſummer corn from the moſt northern countries of Europe, ſowed it in the *middle of May*, and gathered their harveſt in *September*: and this courſe has ever ſince prevailed, when the weather has been favourable enough to admit of it.

In England the wheat is rarely fit for reaping till after it has been ten months in the ground; but in Canada, (as appears from Mr. *Gaulthier's* journal, cited by Mr. *Kalm*) the wheat which was ſown on the 16th of May, in a very favourable year,

* Kalm, vol. iii.

began

began to ſhoot into ears on the 12th of July, and the harveſt was entirely over by the 25th of September; for although the winter is ſuperlatively cold, yet in the ſummer (ſhort as it is) the weather reaches the other extreme. Whence it happens that, as their wheat does not grow till the exceſſive heats arrive, the corn often ſhrivels when it ſhould fill, and comes to nothing; and, not unfrequently, it is nipped by a froſt in the very middle of ſummer, and entirely blighted.

Whether it be owing to this cauſe, or its rarely acquiring the due degree of ripeneſs, we know not for certain; but one circumſtance is certain, and the noble Author acknowledges * "that Canadian "flour will *not keep at ſea*, nor in the *air* "of the *Weſt Indies*." Nothing can well be more inconſiſtent than to acknowledge it an *unmerchantable* article for export to the *Weſt Indies*, and at the ſame moment to † impoſe it upon our ſugar planters for their ſuſtenance: add to this, that if their huſbandry is not in a more improved

* Page 64.

† Page 65, 119, 145, 146.

ſtate

ſtate *now* than it was when Mr. Kalm deſcribed it, the pooreſt potatoe farmer in the wilds of Ireland may diſpute pre-eminence with the yeomanry of Canada; for Mr. Kalm aſſures us, that he diſcovered no farming implements in uſe among them, except the *plough* and *harrow*. "Their *fallow* "lands were never ploughed in ſummer; "ſo that weeds grew without reſtraint in "them, and the cattle were allowed to "go upon them during all the ſummer," in order (we may ſuppoſe) to give the weeds a more luxuriant root. Upon the whole, we muſt conclude, that in ſo unpromiſing a field it may be well for the inhabitants, if they can reap ſufficient *wheat* for their own ſupport, and without being reduced too frequently to the expedient of ſupplying their own wants from other more temperate latitudes. And as the *bad quality* of their *flour* precludes its conſumption in the Weſt Indies, more arguments will not be demanded, to ſhew the abſurdity of conſidering it among the articles proper for that market. I ſhall only, therefore, further obſerve, that if Canada were the mother country to our

ſugar

ſugar colonies, and her flour of the moſt perfect quality, ſhe could not undertake the ſupply of them; ſhe could not maintain a *monopoly*; but would be obliged to ſuffer the import of it from places which are nearer, and from climates more favourable to this production, becauſe the communication cannot be kept open between them the year through.

The beſt *flour*, after its arrival in the Weſt Indies, ſoon becomes corrupted by mouldineſs and the weevil, and therefore cannot be ſtored for any length of time; and if a drowth or hurricane ſhould unfortunately happen in Auguſt, September, or October, the veſſels which might be diſpatched from the iſlands to Canada would rarely, if ever, be able to return before the following ſummer with their loading. In fact, the article *corn* has never made any great figure in the exports of this province, except in one, or at moſt two, uncommonly mild years, when they ſhipped off a quantity of grain. Exported in grain it may probably bear the ſea much better than in flour: but the Weſt India iſlands import no grain

for

for food, except *Indian corn*; and have no flour-mills.

Whilſt this province was in the hands of the French, the whole of its export, at the moſt flouriſhing period, did not exceed much above 110,000l. of which

Furs conſtituted about one half,
Beaver — — one third,
Seal oil — — one tenth,
Peaſe and flour — the ſame,
Wood of various kinds one eighteenth.

Trifling indeed is the proportion which their *agriculture* contributed to this liſt; but it convincingly diſplays to our view *what* thoſe objects of traffic are to which *nature* has limited them, and to the attainment of which their induſtry may be more beneficially directed.—We ſhall paſs now to

ST. JOHN's ISLAND.

TO deſcribe this iſland is to paint another *froſt-piece*: the climate is ſo much a counterpart to the Canadian, that it is needleſs to expatiate upon it. One peculiar

liar evil, indeed, is noticed by the Abbé Raynal, who obſerves, "That by reſtrict-"ing the ſettlers here to *agriculture*, they "were expoſed to famine in theſe unfor-"tunate ſeaſons, which *frequently* happen "on the iſland, when the crops are de-"voured by *field mice* and *graſshoppers*." Thus it happens that vermin deſtroy what the froſts ſpare.

It may appear ſingular, that the ſame degree of cold which is ſo fatal to vegeta-tion, ſhould not exterminate graſshoppers; but it is certain the *ova* of inſects are, by ſome inſcrutable means, wonderfully pre-ſerved in theſe *Arctic* regions; inſomuch, that the moſt northern inhabited parts of Canada are infeſted every ſummer with prodigious ſwarms of gnats, which give no quarter, and afford no reſpite. It is not unlikely but the graſshoppers of St. John's may be a ſpecies of locuſt, and migrate thither in the ſummer months, from the ſouthern parts of the continent.

It would be a groſs inſult upon com-mon ſenſe, to treat of this ſpot as a *provi-ſion country*;—devoting it therefore to the *ſea-cow*, and other fiſheries, the occupa-

tions to which nature has deſtined its inhabitants, we will proceed to

NOVA SCOTIA.

IT has been the common practice with the firſt diſcoverers, grantees, and ſettlers of every one of our colonies, to magnify their ſeveral beauties or advantages, and extenuate their deformities or defects. In proportion as the new-found land has been deſtitute of the common neceſſaries and comforts of human life, the voice of fiction has been clamorous in its panegyric; in firſt diſcoveries it is, in general, vanity, but in all others it is ſelf-intereſt, or a worſe motive, which urges them to commit theſe ſhameful deceptions. I might exemplify this in a variety of inſtances, from Sir *Walter Raleigh*'s romance of "*El Do-*"*rado*," to Dr. *Stork*'s of *Eaſt Florida*. But at preſent I ſhall confine myſelf to *Nova Scotia*.

About the year 1623 Sir *William Alexander*, who had obtained a grant of this country from the crown, drew up and

publiſhed a moſt flattering but fallacious character of it, with a view to *decoy unwary ſettlers* into a place " the *moſt wretched* " (ſays honeſt *Defoe)* that ever was in- " habited, even by barbarians." Sir William's New Scotland was a rich and beautiful ſcenery of ever-verdant hills, and flowery meads. — Here roſes and lilies, mingling their ſweets, perfumed the ambient air. Innumerable varieties of fiſh were ſeen ſporting in the cryſtal rivers. The ſtately groves re-echoed with the vocal melody of feathered ſongſters. Immenſe flocks of other ſpecies preſented themſelves, either to delight the eye with their variegated plumage, or to glut the appetite with their delicious fleſh. The prolific glebe ſpontaneouſly offered fruits of the moſt exquiſite reliſh; and, to crown all, tho' not one human inhabitant exiſted here, the ſpacious plains were mantled over with crops of wheat, barley, and rye, the untaſted boons of nature, to this her favourite ſolitude.

It would not be at all ſurpriſing if the ſame ſtyle of fancy-painting ſhould be revived in our own times. Already the

ſketches traſmitted to us through a news-paper medium, from *Port Roſway*, begin to exhibit a little of the ſame high varniſh; but it is ſurely rather too ſtale an artifice to paſs upon us at preſent; and I honour the noble Author for his candid avowal, that, "*Nova Scotia* has little to "depend upon, beſide her *fiſheries* and her "*woods**."

This province lies between the 44th and 50th degrees of north latitude, and though in a very favourable part of the temperate zone, has a winter of an almoſt inſupportable length and coldneſs, continuing *at leaſt ſeven months* in the year; to this immediately ſucceeds, without the intervention of any thing that may be called ſpring, a ſummer of a heat as violent as the cold, though of no long continuance; and they are wrapt in the gloom of a perpetual fog, even long after the ſummer ſeaſon has commenced †. All the countries north of the ſettlements in New England lie within the verge of the *northern ſnowy moun-*

* European Settlements, vol. ii. p. 274.

† Preſent State, p. 243.

tains on one hand, and the iſlands of ice on the other; which render the climate unfit for agriculture, on account of the inceſſant froſts, and more pernicious cold fogs. Theſe mountains run down to the ſea-coaſt, and leave but here and there a ſpot fit to inhabit; ſo, a ridge of theſe bare and barren eminencies runs through the whole peninſula of Nova Scotia; hence there are but a few inconſiderable ſpots fit to cultivate, and the land is covered with a cold ſpongy moſs in place of graſs, as all countries are that are ſo drenched with ſnow *. The land is ſo barren, that corn does not come up well in it: and though the utmoſt pains be taken to manure it, ſtill the crop will be very inconſiderable, and they are often obliged to throw it up at laſt; for this reaſon they are forced to ſow corn in their marſhes, and what corn they are able to produce is of a ſhriveled kind, like rye.

This is the account which the French give of Nova Scotia, after one hundred years experience; and this has made it ſo

* Relation de l'Acadie, p. 283.

difficult to people that country, which hardly produces either corn or graſs, if it be not had in a few marſhes; and theſe are not fit for corn in any part of the world. The land is not worth the charge of clearing, as it muſt all be grubbed. The ſoil is ſo ſterile, that we ſee manure itſelf will hardly make it yield a crop, not even *now*, when it is freſh: the earth is ſo chilled by the froſts, ſnows, and perpetual fogs, both in winter and ſummer, that it ſeems not to have warmth enough in it to promote the fermentation of manure, and make it convertible to nouriſhment. It is not in the nature of things that any land, whatever may be its *appearance*, can be fruitful in ſuch climates. In ſuch frozen regions we never meet with a fruitful ſoil in any part of the world, much leſs in North America*. To enquire therefore into the particular agriculture of ſuch a country would be abſurd; the nature of the thing ſpeaks itſelf: its inhabitants, while few, muſt ſubſiſt with great difficulty, and, after all their induſtry, at laſt

* Political Eſſays, 4to. p. 240.

not

not draw ſubſiſtence from their *ſoil.* This is the caſe with Nova Scotia :—take from its inhabitants their *fiſhery* (I am ſpeaking in point of *exiſtence*) and you *render their life precarious.*"—So much for the *agriculture* of this country.

I have here given a tranſcript from the very beſt modern authorities extant, of what I believe may be conſidered a faithful picture of this horrid country: theſe authorities have never been contradicted by any authentic pen; unleſs, indeed, ſome ideas looſely thrown out in Abbé Raynal's late publication (a name, I confeſs, of high rank in literature) ſhould be ſuppoſed to imply a different opinion. But although the moſt barren ſubjects become pleaſing under the maſterly touches of this enlightened and elegant writer, yet his miſtakes are very numerous. Speaking of Nova Scotia, he obſerves, that " the " Engliſh iſlands (he means in the Weſt " Indies, I ſuppoſe) will furniſh it with a " certain, eaſy, and almoſt excluſive mart " for its merchandize:" what he means by the word *merchandize* I apprehend is evident from the context, where he treats

of its convenient ſituation for carrying on the cod-fiſhery; and in this he is doubtleſs perfectly correct. *Fiſh* ſeems to be the only article which can properly be deemed a commodity annexed to this province.

In regard to tillage, which we are told was obliged to take refuge in the marſhes, its condition muſt be very deſperate indeed, ſince the low grounds, upon the breaking up of the froſt, are univerſally laid under water by deſtructive inundations. The colony of loyaliſts having fixed their reſidence near the ſouth-eaſt point of the peninſula, which affords an immediate opening to the banks, it is preſumptively clear, that they have not agriculture but fiſhery uppermoſt in their thoughts: this is a proof of the wiſdom of their choice; for the lumber on *Paſſamaquaddy river* they know is in the poſſeſſion of the New Englanders. It is from theſe wood-cutters in the province of *Maine* they were obliged laſt year to purchaſe the very materials required for building their new metropolis: ſome inconſiderable quantities may perhaps be thinly ſcattered over the

the country which lies on the north-weſt ſide of St. John's river; but the only ſpots in this part proper for ſettlements are already pre-occupied (as I am credibly aſſured) by prior grantees.

It is reaſonable to imagine, that in ſuch deſart regions, where the dependence for ſupporting life muſt be placed on *fiſhery*, and *not* on *agriculture*, the *latter* will not claim any preference with the inhabitants; and the whole buſineſs of their annual huſbandry, which a tranſient gleam of ſunſhine compriſes within the ſhort limits of three or four months, can neither admit of ſyſtem nor improvement, nor duly recompenſe the ſevereſt application beſtowed upon it. Let us calmly, then, and ſeriouſly, enquire how far the products of theſe *remaining colonies* of ours in the *north*, are commenſurate to the wants of our Weſt India iſlands? And, ſince the noble Author has thought proper to ſpeak of them moſt diffuſively in the *future tenſe*, it is but fair that we ſhould eſtimate the performance of his promiſes by their *paſt* ability, and form

a judgment of what they *may* do, by what they *have* done.

The annual ſupplies of every kind which were received from Canada and Nova Scotia, into all the Britiſh Weſt India iſlands, amounted (on a medium of the years 1771, 1772, and 1773) to no more in value than — £. Sterling 3,750 which is only about equal to the purchaſe of 350 puncheons of Jamaica rum, out of about 7,300 puncheons, which uſed to go to America from that iſland only.

The annual ſupplies received by thoſe iſlands (at a medium of the ſame three years) from the other parts of the American continent, amounted in value to - - 997,034

The two ſums added, make a total of* - - - - £. 1,000,784

and

* The reader is not to ſuppoſe, that the *value* of the import from North America was £. 1,000,784. This ſum is computed at the *current* prices *in the iſlands, paid* by

and of this, the ſhare furniſhed by Canada and Nova Scotia was no more, therefore, than about $\frac{1}{267}$th part.

The particular ſhare belonging to Nova Scotia alone, amounted to about £. 1,800; which will be thought no unhandſome contribution, when we reflect that this *valuable* province, after it had been one hundred years under the improvement of France, and ſeveral years under our own, and after a *million* of *money* beſtowed upon it by *parliament*, exported, in the year 1761, *in the whole*, not leſs than to the value of "*eighteen pounds, ſix ſhillings and*

by the planters; and includes not only the *freight* from North America, but the *profits* and *commiſſions* of the *merchant-importer*; which being deducted, the real value, at *prime* coſt, will be found very conſiderably under the ſum mentioned; as may eaſily appear, upon conſulting the *table* of *American exports* inſerted in the noble Author's *appendix*. Where (for example) he will obſerve, that the *prime coſt* of *lumber* was only 26 *s. per mill.* though the planter paid £. 5 *per mill.* So the *prime coſt* of *ſhingles* there, ſtated at 8 *s. per mill.* coſt the planter 28 *s.* 6 *d. per mill.*; but this makes no ſort of difference in *comparing* the ſupplies of *Canada* and *Nova Scotia* with thoſe of the *other* diſtricts of America; as the prices of *all* are rated by one and the ſame ſtandard.

"*three*

" *three pence!*" But as we are bid to look up to this colony and Canada for the *future* ſupply of our ſugar iſlands, with the neceſſary articles of ſtaves, flour, and horſes, from the latter; and of lumber, pitch, tar, and fiſh, from the former; it will be neceſſary for us to go on with a ſtatement of the annual demand on the one hand, and the preſent comparative ability of theſe two reſources, on the other.

ANNUAL

ANNUAL SUPPLY of ſundry Plantation Neceſſaries from the American Continent to the Britiſh Sugar Iſlands, computed on an Average of the Three Years before-mentioned.

From the American Continent.			Share of Canada	Share of Nova Scotia.
Lumber -	25,667,245	feet	22,680	54,666
Shingles - -	19,923,731		16,000	45,666
* Staves and heading	19,342,003		450	8,666
Shaken hogſheads	18,012		—	13
Hoops - -	1,579,085		4,750	666
Houſe Frames -	205			
Maſts - - -	52			
Spars - - -	1,034		—	10
Tar, pitch, turpentine	5,674	barrels		
Indian corn -	401,471	buſhels	8	
Beans and peaſe	21,674	d°.	339	99
Bread and flour	130,773	barrels	231	
Ditto	4,366	kegs		
Rice - - -	13,304	barrels		
Ditto - -	7,259	tierces		
Horſes - - -	2,386		—	9
Oxen - - -	1,215			
Sheep and hogs	4,605			
Salt-fiſh -	18,033	hogſh.	111	39
Ditto	16,178	barrels	67	148
Ditto	12,178	quintals	420	566
Ditto	1,304	kegs	203	

* The noble Author *ſuppoſes*, that *ſtaves* for packages for their products may be furniſhed to the ſugar-iſlands from *Britain*. A compariſon

What are we to expect from two ſuch reſources as theſe, whoſe *united* export of that moſt neceſſary article, *ſtaves*, was not ſufficient for making 300 ſugar-hogſheads? A *Canadian horſe* would be a rarity indeed in the torrid zone, where none of that breed has hitherto figured. In every other article the deficiency is ſo palpable, that it requires no comment: and it muſt appear that, to propoſe making our great ſugar manufactories in the Weſt Indies dependent upon theſe two *forlorn hopes*, for their ſubſiſtence and ſupplies, is not leſs abſurd, than if we were to talk of feeding the manufacturers, and ſtocking the looms, of Norwich and Mancheſter

pariſon of the coſt will ſhew upon what terms our planters may expect to be furniſhed in that mode.

The *hogſhead-ſtaves* delivered to them by the *Americans*, at per thouſand, — — — £. Sterling.	5
Will coſt from *Britain*, per ditto, about — —	22 10
Their *puncheon-ſtaves* from the *Americans*, were delivered at per thouſand — — — —	7
But from *Britain* they will coſt per thouſand, delivered, about — — — —	28 10

The difference upon the former is £. 17 10 *per mill.*
and on the latter 21 10

Their manufacture cannot poſſibly ſtand under ſo vaſt a diſparity; for no allowance is made for packages by the *Britiſh* buyers of ſugar and rum.

from

from the deſarts of Iceland:—we may conceive the one to be juſt as feaſible a project as the other.

But the noble Author, fully aware of the *preſent* lamentable inſufficiency, conſoles our *prodigal ſons* of the Weſt, with hopes that, in the great circle of revolving years, the day ſhall come, when, no longer condemned to do penance upon ſwine-huſks, they ſhall regale on the fatted calves of his promiſed land. In the mean time, like ſome village empiric, who, when his *beggarly aſſortment of empty boxes* cannot ſupply the genuine medicine, is never at a loſs for an *excellent ſuccedaneum*; ſo the noble Author aſſures us that the ſhriveled barley, oats, and rye (the crude and abortive emanations of Canada, Nova Scotia, and Saint John's) are *excellent ſubſtitutes* for the flour of New York, and the rice of Carolina. Now, what is this, but the very language of * Lord *Peter?* "By G-d, Sirs, I inſiſt this (mouldy bit "of cruſt) is a joint of as excellent *Ban-* "*ſtead* mutton as ever was taſted; and I'll

* Swift's Tale of a Tub.

"cram

" cram it down your throats, if ye dare to " deny it."

I doubt our proteſtant planters muſt *tranſubſtantiate* their religion as well as their palates, before they will be brought to ſwallow this doctrine: but if they are to be fed with *ſubſtitutes*, why has the noble Author ſtinted them to two or three, when a dozen more may be had from the ſame quarter? * A ſpecies of bread may be made of hips, pine-kernels, and bilberies; and, in *hard times*, fir-tree-cones, hemp-ſeed, acorns, and beechmaſt, have repreſented the *ſtaff of life*. In ſhort, old boots, and leathern aprons, are excellent ſubſtitutes, when famine is at the door; but ſubſtitutes may ſuſtain animal life, without ſuſtaining animal vigour:—true, but they are ſometimes no bad props to ſuſtain a weak argument: and a weak one it is, which, after ſtating that Canada and Nova Scotia *are able* to ſupply the ſugar iſlands with the *principal* articles they want, acknowledges at laſt that they are *unable* to ſupply three of the *moſt important*

* *Joachimus Struppius* has given a large catalogue, to which the reader is referred.

of

of thoſe articles, "*flour*, *rice*, and *Indian* "*corn*," which conſtituted greatly above one-third part of the whole value of their imports from the American continent;—which confeſſes that they are not *now* able to ſupply the *other* articles;—but which reſts the *future* poſſibility of it upon airy conjectures, and frivolous *ifs* and *may-bes* inconſiſtent with the laws of nature, and negatived by every principle of experience and reaſon.

Bewildered in the fogs of Nova Scotia, the noble Author has loſt ſight of *one* very material conſideration, viz. that our ſugar iſlands not only require lumber and proviſions, but a convenient and ſufficient *market for their rum*. When the noble Author ſays, that "our Weſt India "iſlands have the *monopoly* of the *Britiſh* "and *Iriſh* markets," he forgets, that *ſugar* is the only one of all their ſtaples which enjoys this monopoly. *Rum* is one of their principal ſtaples as well as ſugar; but will he aſſert, that *rum* has the *monopoly* of thoſe markets?—we know, on the contrary, that becauſe it claſhes with the *home-diſtillery*, it never can enjoy a monopoly

at

at *this* market; ſome *other*, then, where the ſame cauſe of prohibition does not operate, or does not operate with equal force, is abſolutely neceſſary for our planters; becauſe it is upon *this* article they chiefly rely for paying the annual contingent charges of their culture and manufacture. The American ſtates were uſed to take off between *four* and *five million gallons* every year, in barter for their ſupplies: Britain will not purchaſe, and Canada and Nova Scotia *cannot* either purchaſe or conſume, this quantity, in addition to their accuſtomed import. To oppoſe, therefore, its entry into the *only* market where it has a chance of being vendible, is to aboliſh the very ſtaple itſelf: and, that this muſt be the conſequence of its excluſion from that of the United States, unleſs introduced to them in *Britiſh bottoms*, I have not the ſmalleſt doubt: for it certainly will be granted, that theſe ſtates poſſeſs the *power* of rejecting it, or of dutying it intolerably, if imported in *any* other than their *own ſhipping*.

It will be allowed, that, as the French planters in general clay and refine their ſugars, and produce conſiderably more of this ſtaple than we do, they are able to furniſh a much larger quantity of molaſſes than the Britiſh Iſlands would yield, even if theſe had no diſtilleries. The French, in fact, *have a monopoly* for *their molaſſes* at the *American* market; and are at this inſtant giving every aſſiſtance in their power to the American diſtillers of it. Their object, no doubt, is, to beat us out of this ſtaple of rum, as one great ſtep towards the ruin of our ſugar iſlands: and nothing more is required towards inſuring the ſucceſs of this plan, than the giving a check to the vent of our Britiſh rum at the American market; nor any ſpecies of check ſo likely to anſwer the purpoſe, as this which is now recommended by the noble Author. For, ſince the *diminution* of the *American marine* is held out as the *avowed* pretence, how is it poſſible to ſuppoſe that the United States will not endeavour, by every means in their power, to counteract this principle? The rum of our iſlands is not ſo precious in the eyes of thoſe States,

as to make them ſacrifice any great intereſt of their own, in order to get a ſupply of it. They have managed, for theſe laſt ſeven or eight years, to rub on without it; and, if we adopt the noble Author's ſyſtem, they will contrive to replace it by their own diſtillation of French molaſſes, long before Canada and Nova Scotia can eaſe our planters of two or three thouſand puncheons, much more of forty thouſand.

The ſupplies which our planters require of lumber, and a few other articles, from the American continent, are poſitive neceſſaries for the carrying on their plantations; and the produce of their lands (which in fact is their *money*, for they have none other) affords the only means by which they can pay for thoſe neceſſaries *. In this ſituation, let us enquire upon what grounds the noble Author has conceived a jealouſy of our creating a

* It may be computed that for every *one* ton weight of rum paid by our ſugar iſlands to the Americans for ſtaves, as many packages were made as were ſufficient to ſtow *eighty-five tons* of ſugar, or other products, for the loading of Britiſh homeward-bound ſhips.

moſt formidable marine for the *ſouthern American States*, if the former intercourſe between them and our ſugar iſlands, by American veſſels, ſhould in any degree be revived? To judge of what the noble Author's *real* ſentiments are upon this head, from the opinions which he has ſcattered in other parts of his work, we ought certainly to conclude, that *he* feels *no* ſuch jealouſy. For, when the noble Author lays down his principles upon what is the *genuine conſtituent* of a growing and ſolid maritime ſtrength, he ſays, "The Newfoundland *fiſhery* is, without a doubt, the "moſt extenſive nurſery for ſeamen, and "thoſe of the very beſt ſort: That fiſheries, "coaſting trade, and northern voyages, "produce hardy and intrepid ſeamen; but "that *African* and *Indian voyages deſtroy* "*many, and debilitate more:* That in the "year 1772 the number of perſons em-"ployed in the *fiſheries* of Newfoundland, "and our remaining Colonies, amounted to "25,000, including boys, which are *more* "*than double the number that were employed* "*in the trade of the American States*; and "this excluſive of the ſeamen employed

" in the other branches of trade in Canada " and Nova Scotia. From *this nurſery*, " upon the breaking out of a war, *our* " *navy has ſeldom failed of receiving a large* " *and ſeaſonable ſupply of men.*"

In confirmation of theſe poſitions, which are certainly juſt, it may be obſerved, that the tonnage belonging to the ſingle province of Maſſachuſet, which carried on a very extenſive *fiſhery*, amounted very nearly to an equality with that of Pennſylvania, the Jerſeys, and New York, united; and would probably have much exceeded it, if the latter had not likewiſe enjoyed ſome ſhare in the *fiſheries*. If there be truth and ſolid good ſenſe in theſe principles, what is it we can have to fear from a *limited* intercourſe permitted between our ſugar iſlands and the middle and ſouthern American States? A *limited* intercourſe implies a very different one from what *formerly* ſubſiſted: ſo that the *excluſion* of a variety of articles, formerly obtained by this channel, neceſſarily ſuppoſes a proportionable diminution of veſſels or tonnage, and mariners employed in the conducting of it. A *ſhort* navigation, in one undeviating track,

track,—in ſeas for the moſt part pacific and unhazardous,—in a climate which *deſtroys* or *debilitates*,—is, upon the noble Author's own principles, the very worſt adapted poſſible for the breeding and forming of able ſeamen: and a trade within the tropics may be their *grave*, but cannot be their *nurſery*.

In regard to the number of veſſels, mariners, and the tonnage, which this intercourſe formerly employed, we have no lights that can be entirely truſted to direct us; for a great many of the American veſſels made at leaſt two or three trips within the ſpace of a twelvemonth, and of courſe occaſioned a double or triple entry in the books of the Cuſtom Houſe. The noble Author indeed takes notice of this circumſtance, in an advertiſement ſubjoined to his Appendix*; obſerving, "That the tonnage is in *many inſtances* repeated *two* or *three* times, or as often as "the veſſel ſails from port in the ſame "year." This muſt have happened conſtantly, in reſpect to the veſſels employed

* He remarks the ſame in p. 88.

in the Weſt India trade, which made up their aſſortments by coaſting from province to province, and touching at a variety of different ports in their way. The noble Author will not allow that any exaggeration *can* happen from this cauſe; becauſe he aſſerts, that theſe veſſels were *one-third* of their real tonnage *under-regiſtered* (which, if a fact, is *equally true* of our own ſhipping); and that this evaſion will make up the difference. Admitting all this, the noble Author ought to have diſtinguiſhed to our view, what the number of veſſels and quantity of tonnage were, which the trade with our ſugar iſlands employed. A general ſtatement of what went to other parts of the Weſt Indies, conveys no pertinent information upon this ſubject.

To ſupply this omiſſion, in ſome meaſure, I beg to mention, that the whole tonnage of the American veſſels, which entered at the iſland of Jamaica in the year 1774, was, as I am informed, 12,000 tons. If we allow 16,000 for the other Britiſh ſugar iſlands, the total will be 28,000 tons: and the reader is deſired to recollect, that included

cluded in this ſtatement are not only the veſſels belonging to the United States, but to every other part of North America where a Britiſh ſettlement was eſtabliſhed; viz. Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Penſacola, Mobille, Eaſt Florida, Canada, and Nova Scotia.

Now the noble Author having given us, in his Appendix, a ſtate of tonnage belonging to veſſels which cleared from theſe ſeveral places in the year 1770, which makes the amount 385,446 tons, it will appear, that if we could ſuppoſe even 30,000 or 40,000 of this quantity occupied in the ſupply of our ſugar iſlands, which is the utmoſt that can be imagined, it is not much more than a *thirteenth part* of the *whole:* ſo that the tonnage belonging to the ſhare which the United States poſſeſſed of this ſupply, was probably not one-half of what will be required only to bring their ſingle article of tobacco to Great Britain; of which there was imported here, in the year 1775, near 51,000 *tons* weight, moſt part of which was, no doubt, of the growth of Virginia and Maryland.

In ſhort, when we reflect on their bulky ſtaples of naval ſtores,

Flour,
Fiſh,
Rice,
Tobacco, and
Indigo,

and what numbers of ſhips and ſeamen muſt be annually required for the tranſport acroſs the Atlantic, and the diſtribution of theſe articles to many different parts of Europe, we cannot poſſibly think of the paltry intercourſe of ſloops and ſchooners with our ſugar iſlands in a *formidable* light; and eſpecially if we call to mind what the noble Author aſſures us (p. 197,) that the *ſouthern States* (of whoſe naval proweſs he now profeſſes ſuch a dread) had *ſcarcely any ſeamen* belonging to them, *natives* of thoſe provinces; but were under the neceſſity of employing, in this very trade, "*chiefly Britiſh* and *Iriſh* ſailors:"—and that (p. 205.) even the whole body of the United States, northern, ſouthern, and middle, "*cannot* pretend to a *navy*:"—and that, even in the late war, "the beſt in-"formed ſay, that *not leſs* than *three-*

"*fourths*

"*fourths* of the crews of the American "privateers were *Europeans.*"

Thus the noble Author not only furniſhes objections, but anſwers them: and all jealouſies founded upon that intercourſe, as creative of a numerous marine to the *ſouthern States* of America (the leaſt of all the objects of dread) muſt be rather *affected* than real. For, if *real*, I would aſk, Upon what national motive is it, that the *ſame* proclamation, which prohibits the ſubjects of the United States from carrying their ſtaves and lumber to our ſugar iſlands, has nevertheleſs allowed, invited, and encouraged thoſe very ſubjects to bring *every* unmanufactured commodity or merchandize whatever, of their *own growth* and *produce* (not excepting *indigo* and *tobacco*, and only excepting *oil*) *in their own ſhipping*, upon the ſame footing as if imported by *Britiſh ſubjects* in *Britiſh ſhipping* from any *Britiſh* plantations?—Thus the American, when he goes to St. Kitt's with his cargo of lumber, finds himſelf renounced as an *alien*; but when he lands with the ſame cargo at Liverpool, he is careſſed and welcomed, as a naturalized Briton.

ton. To carry *ſuch* articles in a Philadelphia or Carolina ſhallop to a *Britiſh ſugar iſland*, creates a tremendous nurſery for American ſeamen, and is a horrible violation of the *principle* of our Navigation Act; but to carry the *ſame* articles, and a hundred more, to *Great Britain*, in *American ſhips* of the *largeſt burthen*, is quite another thing: this is perfectly harmleſs,—creates no ſuch nurſery,—and is not at all adverſe to the *principle* of that Act.

If the motives for this inconſiſtency are reconcileable with the noble Author's Diſſertation upon the *Art of propagating Seamen*, an ordinary underſtanding would conclude, that our deſign is to withdraw theſe Americans from that neſt of death and contagion the Weſt Indies, and guide them with a friendly hand into a more extended and more ſalutary ſyſtem of direct navigation from their own coaſt to Europe; as one of the beſt fitted, perhaps, for habituating them to conſtruct ſhips of large burthen, and for raiſing a corps of healthy, intrepid, and experienced ſailors to man their future navy. So that, if the noble Author's ſentiments carry any weight in them,

them, the trade of the United States with our ſugar iſlands can neither intereſt Britain in a *mercantile* view (becauſe it is allowed, on all hands, the freight of lumber, ſtaves, and ſhingles, will not pay the charges) nor in a *political* (becauſe it will *enervate* and *deſtroy* the mariners employed in it).—This being the caſe, to relinquiſh it, either in the whole or in part, is not "*to ſacrifice*," but *to preſerve*, the *marine of Great Britain*. The excluſive carrying trade *between thoſe iſlands and Europe*, is the advantage *worth* our retention: and *this* we ſhall retain moſt effectually, *provided* the veſſels of the American traders thither be *limited*, as propoſed, to that very ſmall burthen, which precludes them from proceeding acroſs the Atlantic with the cargoes they may take in.

When the noble Author ſpeaks of "the very flouriſhing trade of *France* in "the Weſt Indies,—how much ſhe de-"pends upon that trade for the ſupport of "her marine,—and how many ſhips and "ſeamen ſhe employs in it,"—we cannot but enquire, To what end is all this?—and, To what does it apply?—Certainly not to the intercourſe of *French ſhipping* with

the *northern Colonies*. The ſhipping and the ſeamen, to which he alludes, are employed in the *direct carrying* trade between their *Weſt India poſſeſſions* and *Europe*. The French poſſeſs, in the Weſt Indies, three times as much territory as we poſſeſs; therefore they can employ more in culture. Their lands, particularly at St. Domingo, are far more productive; therefore their produce is larger in proportion. Their colonies are much more populous in whites; therefore better ſettled. They enjoy a greater variety of ſtaples; therefore can give ampler freight, and to a larger number of ſhipping. Their ſhips are obliged to carry a larger complement of hands; therefore they employ (in the voyage *out* at leaſt) more hands in proportion.

There is nothing extraordinary in all this; but it is a very extraordinary poſition (p. 152.) "That it is *better* to *give up* our "*ſugar iſlands*, than *give up* the *buſineſs* of "*carrying* their *lumber* and *proviſions*:" a *buſineſs* which our merchants and ſhipowners were always at liberty to undertake before the late war; and which none (there is good reaſon to believe) ever did undertake

take without loſing by it. "*Long voyages,*" ſays a commercial writer * (and ſurely a voyage to our iſlands of five to ſix weeks *out*, and eight to ten weeks *home*, may be called a *long one*) "are the *true nurſe-*
"*ries for ſeamen*; nor is navigation *ſo much*
"obliged to any trade as *that* which occa-
"ſions them. They encourage the building
"and fitting out of ſtout ſhips; they ren-
"der courage, activity, vigour, and ſkill
"neceſſary in a number of captains and
"ſeamen; and prove, in theſe and all
"other reſpects, of *incomparable value* to a
"*maritime nation*; inſomuch that *thoſe*
"*branches* of *commerce*, and *thoſe ſettlements*,
"which are the ſupport of *long voyages*,
"ought, from every ſenſible people, to re-
"ceive peculiar attention."—*Such* a carrying trade as is here repreſented, between Great Britain and her remote poſſeſſions in the Weſt Indies, belongs only to ſhips of *large* burthen; but is ſurely quite diſtinct from the carrying trade between the continent of America and thoſe iſlands, in a ſhort run of a few days, and in petty veſſels of only one deck. The difference is as great as between the *carrying buſineſs*

* Political Eſſays.

of

of a *Newcaſtle collier* and a *Batterſea turnip boat*.

Such articles of ſupply, therefore, as may be enumerated, may be ſafely permitted, I apprehend, to be brought in ſloops, ſchooners, or ſmall brigs of equally little burthen, belonging to the United States; and we will ſuppoſe no juſt objection can be made to their being allowed to take in barter the articles,

Sugar,
Rum and Molaſſes,
Cocoa,
Coffee,
Pimento,
Ginger,
Limes and Oranges.

In regard to *ſugar*, no detriment to this nation is likely to enſue from its paſſing with the reſt. If any miſchief ſhould be diſcovered hereafter, it will always be in the power of government to except it. But *at preſent* it affords no pretext whatever for alarm; and the noble Author himſelf gives the true reaſon why it does not, when he affirms (p. 107.) "It is "clear that *our ſugars* will *not* be taken "for *conſumption* in the American States:"

and

and for two reaſons; firſt, becauſe (p. 107.) "*nearly one-half* of the ſugar entered in "North America, came from the *foreign* "*iſlands*;" therefore only the *other half* (3000 to 4000 hogſheads) came from our own: and ſecondly, becauſe (p. 153.) the Americans "may purchaſe this article, at "the *foreign iſlands*, from 15 to 25 *per* "*cent. cheaper.*" In *Europe*, too, he informs us (p. 153.) "This article is ſold "25 *per cent. at leaſt*, at the *foreign* mar-"kets, *under* the price given for it in "*Britain.*"—"The greateſt quantity ever "ſent in one year from our iſlands to "America," he ſays (p. 152.) "was "about 4400 hogſheads of 1000 pounds "each." From theſe circumſtances it is evident,

Firſt, That the Americans are not likely to take off ſuch a quantity of our ſugars for *their* home conſumption, as to affect the ſupply of the *Britiſh* market.

Secondly, That it cannot be their intereſt to deal with our iſlands largely for this article for *their own* conſumption; becauſe they may buy what they want at *from* 15 *to* 25 *per cent.* cheaper at the *foreign* ſugar iſlands.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Nor to carry it for ſale to any *European* market (except that of *Britain)*; becauſe it will be *underſold* at leaſt 25 *per cent.* at the *foreign European* markets.

Fourthly and laſtly, For the very ſame reaſon, no Britiſh planters will chuſe to *remit* it by an *American* veſſel to any foreign European market, at 25 or upwards *per cent.* loſs;—a loſs which the noble Author himſelf avers (p. 153.) "would "*completely ruin* them."

Thus, if the noble Author himſelf has not entirely refuted his own objections againſt the permitting our planters in the iſlands to diſpoſe of *ſugars*, among other articles of their produce, in payment for the ſupplies which they may take from the ſubjects of the United States,—all danger of inſtituting the Americans as *carriers* of this article to *foreign ports in Europe*, cannot fail of being completely removed, by *limiting the tonnage* of the American bottoms employed in trade with thoſe iſlands. And indeed, without the aſſiſtance of this article, ſmall as the quantity ſo diſpoſed of may be, it will be difficult to prevent a large annual balance accruing againſt our ſugar iſlands; which balance,

whenever

whenever the products of their culture become deficient in the barter of commodities with the Americans, must be paid in *money*. *Jamaica* is the only one of all our sugar islands, which is qualified to bring the annual balance in its own favour: for there are several articles necessary to the Windward islands, which Jamaica more or less supplies within itself; and will very seldom have occasion to purchase, in any other than a moderate quantity, of the Americans: for instance,

Indian Corn,
Beans and Pease,
Poultry,
Horses,
Oxen,
Sheep and hogs.

It will likewise require a very inferior share of lumber and shingles *.

And possessing, on the other hand, the staple

* The proportion between *Jamaica* and the *other* islands, as to these articles, is as follows:

	Jamaica. Import.		The other Islands. Import.
Bread and Flour,	39,581	barrels and kegs	95,558
Lumber,	6,197,322	feet	19,469,923
			Staves,

ſtaple of *pimento*, which the other iſlands have not; beſides the ſtaples of coffee and ginger, which it enjoys in common with ſome of the others; and having its ſuperior rum,—a moſt conſiderable article in barter,—it may be able, at leaſt, to manage the commerce with the Americans upon even terms.—In regard to *flour*, it will occur to many, that Britain, in imitation of France, ought to reſerve to herſelf the ſupply of this profitable article. There can be no good reaſon aſſigned, it may be ſaid, why the mother country ſhould not adminiſter a good proportion of this ſupply, whenever her harveſt admits of it; provided ſhe grants ſuch a bounty *per* quarter upon the export, as may reduce the freight from Europe to the iſlands to a

	Jamaica. Import.	The other Iſlands. Import.
Staves, Heading, and Shingles	15,459,655 —	23,806,079
Wood Hoops —	94,425 —	1,484,660
Indian Corn, Beans, and Peaſe — —	48,339 buſhels	394,806
		and 7,725 Oats
	Total	402,231
Horſes — — —	660 —	1,726
Oxen — — — — — — —		1,215

ſtandard

ſtandard of equality, at leaſt, with the freight from the American continent to them.

But a very ſubſtantial reaſon is to be given, why the exiſtence of our ſugar iſlands ſhould not be endangered, by compelling them to depend *ſolely* or *materially* upon Great Britain for the conſtant ſupply of this, and ſome other articles, of their neceſſary ſuſtenance. The French planters, being obliged by their government to cultivate perpetually a certain number of acres with proviſion, in proportion to their negroes, are for this reaſon ſomewhat better ſecured againſt the danger of ſudden want. It is not ſo with the Britiſh Windward iſland planters in general; and therefore, wanting land to ſpare for that purpoſe, they require an unfailing ſupply by import; and muſt be in danger of ſtarving, if it ſhould, upon certain emergencies,—as drowth, blight, and hurricane,—happen to be too long withheld, or not poured in upon them in an extraordinary quantity.

The neceſſity peculiar to their ſituation will over-rule the propriety, which

otherwiſe might ſeem to exiſt, of confining them ſingly to Great Britain for their *daily bread*. Beſides, even in Britain, the harveſt is very uncertain; and that noble law, which by encouraging the export of corn has ſo greatly enlarged the agriculture of the kingdom, as it only opens the ports in ſtrict conſonance with the inſtant price of this article at the home market (which in the nature of things muſt ever be fluctuating) would frequently be obliged to refuſe a ſupply, even at a time, perhaps, of the moſt urgent want prevailing in all the ſugar iſlands. And conſidering the great ſpace of ſea, which divides the feeders from the perſons requiring to be fed, it would be utterly impracticable, in the event of deſolation by hurricane, that their neceſſities could be early enough known by, much leſs relieved from, Europe.

What muſt have been the fate of the ſugar iſlands laſt year, in the event of a hurricane, but either inevitable famine, or a recourſe to the United States?—when Great Britain, as the noble Author informs us (p. 270.) was obliged "to ſend

"abroad

"abroad *above a million and half ſterl-*
"*ing*, to purchaſe *upwards of one million*
"*quarters of foreign corn*" for her own ſubſiſtence. France has ſometimes been under the like diſtreſs, but probably not ſince (following our example) ſhe permitted the *export* of her corn; which wiſe ſtep has wonderfully extended tillage in every part of that fertile kingdom. To monopolize a *neceſſary of life*, without poſſeſſing the ability of ſupplying it, would be a tyranny worſe than impolitic, —it would be impious.

For the ſupply, therefore, of every ſpecies of vegetable ſuſtenance, the American continent ought to be left free and open to our ſugar iſlands; becauſe they can look with a degree of abſolute certainty to that continent, where, in ſuch an extent of latitude and variety of climates, a general want of ability to afford the ſupply can hardly ever occur. But they would have only a very precarious proſpect of relief, indeed, from Great Britain. The granaries of the former, are, as it were, at their very door, and preſent immediate protection againſt famine: a protection

which might not be in the power of Britain to give, notwithſtanding her utmoſt diſpatch and exertion.

A further and very important conſideration is, that Britain cannot ſupply theſe proviſions in equal perfection. No ſpecies of proviſion can bear a long voyage, and the preparations of grain and pulſe leaſt of any: *muſt* and *vermin* quickly corrupt, and render them unfit for human uſe. This was remarkably verified upon the breaking out of the war with America, when a ſudden unuſual demand upon Britain from our ſugar iſlands (ſuch as would happen after every hurricane, if they could import from no other place) occaſioned a large quantity of flour to be ſhipped from this kingdom in a hurry; moſt of which, on its being landed in the Weſt Indies, was quite unſerviceable. The vicinity of the American ports enabled our planters to import it in a ſound and perfect ſtate. They called for and received theſe periſhable commodities in moderate quantities at a time, ſuited to their occaſional neceſſities and temporary conſumption. The Iriſh butter which comes

to

to the Weſt Indies between the months of April and October, is generally liquefied into a rancid oil, more diſguſting, if poſſible, than *blubber*; which none of mankind, except the *Eſquimaux* ſavages, would ſwallow by choice. But our planters will certainly, neither by choice nor by compulſion, be induced to live upon muſty flour, or train oil.

After all, let it be remarked, that if we were to ſucceed in excluding the flour of the United States from our Weſt India market,—it is a ſtroke under which our fellow-ſubjects in the Weſt Indies might ſeverely ſuffer, but it would do little towards leſſening the number of American ſhipping and ſeamen. The Americans export only their ſuperfluity: and in proportion to their rapid increaſe of population, their export of *flour* may probably, for a time, be rather leſs than what it has been; it may be diminiſhed, likewiſe, at the French and Britiſh Weſt India iſlands, by coming in competition there with French and Britiſh flour. But the ſuperfluity, be it what it may, will have vent ſomewhere: and moſt naturally will paſs on directly

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to ſome European market, where it will occupy the place of Britiſh and French flour. But the quantity which they ſent to our ſugar iſlands, was, we may imagine, at no time an object of that vaſt magnitude to the Americans, that ſome perſons appear to ſuppoſe. In the year 1770, they exported

	Tons.	Cwts.
To Europe - -	22,347 :	8
Africa - -	71 :	16
Foreign Settlements in the Weſt Indies -	15,231 :	4
	37,650 :	8
Britiſh Weſt Indies	8,218 :	—
Total	45,868 :	8

So that the tonnage which our ſugar iſlands gave occaſion to employ in the navigation of this article, was not much more than *one part in ſix*. The greater part of the ſupply ſent to the *foreign* Weſt Indies, was probably taken off by the *Spaniards*; the *French* perhaps took a *leſs* quantity, but certainly took *ſome*; for *American* veſſels were allowed to bring into the French

free

free ports, at all times, lumber, *flour*, and other vegetable proviſions, cattle, and ſalt-fiſh; and, in times of calamity, the governors and intendants had a diſcretionary power of opening *all* the other ports, for the admiſſion of the ſame articles of ſuſtenance.

Whatever the noble Author may have inadvertently thrown out, it will never be ſuppoſed, by men of candour, that our planters, in aſking for a revival of the ſupply trade in *American bottoms*, are actuated by any idea the moſt diſtant of ſerving America to the injury of their *mother country*. They are ſolicitous that their ſupplies may be brought to them regularly, conveniently, cheaply, and at all times ſufficiently, as heretofore. And if they could be ſo conveyed to them in *Britiſh vehicles*, and their rum and ſmaller articles taken in ready payment, they have no wiſh in favour of American vehicles. But as the one mode gives them certainty and ſecurity, which the other is far from giving, and in fact *is unable* to give,—the very ſalvation of their ſtaples, and in ſome caſes their very exiſtence, determine them to

that

that which is certain and ſecure, in preference to the other which is not ſo.

I will not lengthen the argument with further amplification; becauſe I am perſuaded that the wiſdom of Parliament will neither blindly concede to our ſugar iſlands any indulgences unfit to be granted to them, nor lay them under any reſtrictions which have a tendency to impair their proſperity by depreſſing their culture. For it is their *culture* which is the *true foundation of all their value to this nation:* and if we reflect but for a moment on the nature of their ſtaple productions, we ſhall think it no paradox to aſſert, that any one of the ſmalleſt of our ſugar iſlands is of far more value to Great Britain than all the land in Canada and Nova Scotia together, that either is now, or that ever will or can be, cultivated.

But upon this point, the noble Author, in the warmth of his zeal for the refugees, has advanced ſuch opinions, and recommended to government ſuch a ſyſtem for the ſettling of thoſe northern diſtricts, as not only run counter to the maxims and principles of our ableſt commercial writers,

but

but to that *experience* by which, ſo unhappily for our nation, thoſe maxims and principles have been recently verified. To offer here at large what has been over and over again delivered to the public by others, is needleſs repetition: I ſhall therefore ſtate, conciſely as I can, what has been laid down, and what clearly muſt appear to be the right policy of *Great Britain*, in regard to eſtabliſhing colonies, ſo far as reſpects the particular ſubject before us.

"The *true uſe* of colonies being the "production of ſuch commodities as *can-* "*not* be produced *at home*, to the end "that the commodities of the latter may "be *exchanged* for the productions of the "former; this uſe cannot be anſwered "by forming ſettlements in a *climate* "which is *ſimilar to* that of the *mother* "*country*."

Let us apply this unanſwerable maxim to our preſent ſubject.

The *northern* parts of the *American* continent, in reſpect of *climate*, ſoil, agriculture, and manufactures, admit of little or no culture, *different from* that of *Great Britain*:

Britain: their *ſtaples,* therefore, are nearly *the ſame.* Their *fiſheries* are *not ſtaples,* becauſe they are not *products* of the *ſoil.*

The more this ſubject is enquired into, the more evidently it will appear, that the production of *ſtaple commodities (different* from thoſe of the *mother country)* is the *only* buſineſs proper for *colonies.* It was for want of this capital foundation of a colony, that our *northern* ſettlements were filled with *farmers, manufacturers, merchants, fiſhermen,* and *ſeamen,* but *no* planters. This is preciſely the caſe with Britain herſelf; conſequently a *rivalry* between them immediately took place. In the article of *fiſheries* it ſucceeded ſo effectually, that the northern colonies nearly beat us out of that belonging to Newfoundland, that *great nurſery of ſeamen:* and the ſhare in it of *New England alone, exceeded* that of *Britain.* Can any one in his ſenſes think, then, that the *trade,* and *navigation,* and *fiſheries* of *ſuch* colonies are worth one *groat* to this nation?

Upon this very ground, Sir *J. Child* (a name

name which the noble Author ſeems very much and very deſervedly to reſpect) expreſſes (p. 225.) his apprehenſions of *New England*; becauſe, " of all his Majeſty's " American plantations, there is not one " *ſo apt* for the *building of ſhipping*, nor " one comparably *ſo well qualified* for the " *breeding of ſeamen, principally by means* of " their *cod and mackarel fiſheries*."

The grand miſtake of Great Britain clearly has been, in ſettling ſo conſiderable a part of our *late* colonies in a climate *incapable* of yielding the commodities *wanted* in Britain. Is it to be wondered at, that, finding ſhoals of marketable *fiſh* in their very *harbours*, they ſhould catch and ſell them? and that, feeling the importance of their ſituation for *trade*, and the *ſeamen* their *fiſhery* maintained, they ſhould enter into *commerce* as much as they were able? It was impoſſible, for many years after their ſettlement, they ſhould have any *manufacture* worth ſpeaking of; their *fiſhery* and *trade*, therefore, were *all* they had to purchaſe manufactures with: and very great folly it had been,

if

if they had ſhut their eyes againſt the only light they had to guide them.

But what ſhall we ſay to a ſyſtem of politics directly contrary to theſe plain facts? After every man of common ſenſe in the kingdom muſt have ſeen and conſidered the great difference between *ſugar* and *tobacco*, and *corn* and *fiſh*;—after all this, what are we to think of our expending largely *above a million ſterling*, in planting *another* colony yet *more to the north* than any of the reſt? If, in another century, this kingdom was to feel as many evils from the *Nova Scotians* as we have experienced from the *New Englanders*, upon *whom* would the *blame* lie?—the *inhabitants*, for taking the readieſt means of maintaining themſelves?—or *Britain*, for planting them?

"Will you plant" (ſays a very ſenſible writer*) "a tract of land which produces "*wheat*, *barley*, and *oats*, or one which "yields *ſugar*, *ſpices*, and *wine*?"—In the year 1750, we poſſeſſed the *Bahama Iſlands* and *Nova Scotia*—both uncultivated. The

* Polit. Eſſ. p. 444.

expence of the former already fixed, in having a civil eſtabliſhment; that of the latter to form. The one productive of the tropical fruits; the other ſcarcely yielding the neceſſaries of life, but *peculiarly ſituated for rivalling us* in the *Newfoundland fiſhery*. If any perſon was ignorant of the fact, would it be poſſible for him to conceive that *we choſe the latter?* It may be ſaid, perhaps, we ſettled *Nova Scotia* upon *political* motives, relative to the *neighbourhood* of the *French*. But in ſuch a caſe a *ſingle fortification* was ſufficient, with only the expence of a military eſtabliſhment; and not a *farming* and *fiſhing colony*, ſettled at a *prodigious expence* to the nation, and even *bounties* granted them for *fiſhing*.

" The French acted more wiſely, when " they built Louiſbourg as a place of " ſtrength and ſecurity, and a protection " to their *European fiſhery*; but did not " colonize or plant the land: nor did " Louiſbourg ever rival St. Maloes."

There were expectations indulged, at the cloſe of our laſt war, that, having ſeen the error of colonizing in *northern* latitudes,

and

and of fixing numerous bodies of people, where they muſt ſubſiſt either upon the *national bounty* (like our own unemployed *poor*) *or* by *rival* occupations,—we ſhould have turned our attention to the *Bahama* and *Summer iſlands*, as the fitteſt receptacles, in point of *national utility*, for thoſe worthy people, who adhered to the royal ſtandard in our late conteſt. Theſe ſpots are univerſally allowed to be very fertile, and adapted to every kind of tropical production. Even the celebrated *Tinian* (according to Mr. *Bruce*'s account) does not excel ſome of theſe beautiful iſlands; which, notwithſtanding our care to reclaim them by the late treaty, ſeem ſtill deſtined, by our unaccountable neglect, to remain uſeleſs waſtes.

Inſtead of colonizing theſe valuable ſpots, we are *now*, it ſeems, *once more* to employ ourſelves upon *peopling* and *planting* ſuch wretched countries as *Nova Scotia* and *St. John's*, where the inhabitants are in danger of being frozen to death for *nine months* in the year, and can ſcarcely produce bread to eat the *other three!*—What is not leſs unaccountable is, that

the

the ſame noble Author, who has taken ſo much pains to alarm the minds of the public with bugbear terrors and jealouſies about the *growing naval* power of *Maryland* and *Georgia*, ſhould beſtow ſtill greater pains towards laying the foundation of *real, ſubſtantial naval force*, and future independence, in thoſe *northern* colonies, in whoſe commendation he *is ſo laviſh*.

It is ſufficient to look over the liſt, which the noble Author enumerates, of the products and occupations either now exiſting, or which he ſtrenuouſly adviſes us to promote, in *Canada*, *Nova Scotia*, and *St. John's*, to be ſatisfied that there is ſcarcely one attainable among them (lumber and ſuch trifling ones excepted) which does not enter into competition with Great Britain. Behold then the *rent-roll* of their effects, ſuch as they are, or are meant to be. And firſt,

Flax and Hemp.

That *theſe* can never become *ſtaple* articles of produce in *Nova Scotia*, we have the beſt reaſon to believe, becauſe neither

the lands of *New York* nor of *New England* were found either ſtrong or rich enough to produce them. The enormous bounty of £.12 *per ton* was granted to the former province, to encourage the raiſing hemp, and expired without any effect: and after the bounty in Queen Anne's time was granted for the ſame purpoſe, proper perſons were ſent over to *New England*, to inſtruct that colony in the manner of planting it. But all attempts to produce it in that province likewiſe failed; and it was complained of "as exhauſting both "their *corn land* and *manure*."

The rich, deep, and moiſt ſoil, near the banks of the *Ohio* and *Miſſiſſippi*, is acknowledged to be the *only one* upon this continent fitted to the cultivation of *flax* and *hemp*. In *other* parts they can only be produced in trifling quantities, and upon little ſpots, for the mere accommodation of the poor families who *manufacture their own clothing*. Since, therefore, they cannot, after repeated trials, be made *ſtaples* of New England or of New York, ſtill leſs can we expect to find them anſwer in the more barren ſoil of *Nova*

Scotia. The export of theſe articles to Britain, from the whole continent, amounted, in the year 1770, to no more in value than £. 130 !—a ſmall help towards making up the ſum of £. 500,000, which is what we probably pay for what we import from the *Baltic.*

Iron.

The noble Author makes no doubt but there is *iron ore* to be found in Nova Scotia: we may be confident there is no other country under the ſun where iron is not, in ſome ſhape or other, to be found. Hitherto we have heard of no ſuch mines diſcovered in it. As for Canada, we know it poſſeſſes a bog ore, and is ſaid to manufacture pots, kettles, and other utenſils with it, for its own inhabitants. The public of this kingdom will decide how much the Canadian ore, *thus* wrought and applied, contributes to the emolument of *Great Britain.* In ſome of the United States it was a more conſiderable article; but, from the whole continent of America, Great Britain received,

in the year 1770, only 7,850 tons; moſt if not all of which, came from the colonies *ſouth* of *New England*. Some inſignificant portion went likewiſe, in bars, to our ſugar iſlands; which, no doubt, may be as convenient a market for the *Nova Scotian* ironmongers, when their (yet undiſcovered) *mines* ſhall come to be wrought, and their buſineſs properly eſtabliſhed.

Pot-aſh.

So long as the Canadians and Nova Scotians continue to enjoy wood ſufficient for *fuel*, it is certain (as the noble Author obſerves) that their "conſumption of wood during their tedious and "ſevere winters" will be very abundant; but *as yet*, it ſeems, theſe coloniſts are not perfected in the art of manufacturing *pot-aſh*.

Timber, Lumber, Staves, Shingles.

A very moderate contribution only of *ſtaves*, for the Weſt India market, is to be expected from either of theſe provinces: for it is ſuſpected that the *white* and *red oak* are not to be found in them, or at leaſt

leaſt not of the proper dimenſions, nor in ſufficient abundance: and it deſerves enquiry, whether their timber in general is not too ſappy, and of too lax a texture, to endure expoſure in the Weſt India ſun, without warping, ſplitting, and becoming otherwiſe unſerviceable. Some of the moſt ſolid, compact, and durable timber in the world, grows in the Weſt Indies: and (in proportion) that timber which grows on the American continent, in the nearer vicinities to the Tropic, is ſuperior, for Weſt India ſervice, to that of the northern parts. Hence the preference deſervedly given to lumber and ſhingles from Maryland, Carolina, and Georgia.

Pitch and Tar.

The noble Author himſelf has afforded us very convincing reaſons (p. 69.) why *no ſuch ſtaple* is to be expected in *Nova Scotia*. The tree (the * *red pine*) is *not found* on *this continent* in foreſts, " nor

* None of the other ſpecies of fir are fit for the purpoſe, becauſe they do not yield tar enough to repay the trouble of making it.

"in any quantities, *north of Virginia.*" Hitherto *North Carolina* only has been the chief manufacturer and exporter of them: and therefore the noble Author, with reſpect to *Nova Scotia*, only conjectures it *poſſible*, that the *Loyaliſts* lately ſettled there *may* * ſupply theſe articles. But upon what grounds the noble Author calculates even this *poſſibility* (unleſs his *Loyaliſts* are gifted with *miraculous* powers) we are left entirely in the dark.

Indian Corn,

the noble Author tells us †, *may be* raiſed in *Nova Scotia:* it were to be wiſhed he had produced a better authority than mere aſſertion. Like hemp, it is a very exhauſting plant, requires a deep, rich ſoil, and warm atmoſphere, and ſhould never be adopted any where but from neceſſity; becauſe it is ſufficient to ſterilize the fertileſt lands. We may reſt aſſured it *never can* be raiſed to perfection, *if at all*, in the barren, frozen ſoil of *Nova Scotia:* and that it muſt either come to our iſlands from the *ſouthern ſtates*

* Page 77. † Page 131.

of

of the continent, or be ſtruck out of the liſt.

Wheat and Flour } of Canada.

* *Fine* Barley
* *Good* Rye
* *Tolerable* Oats } of Canada and Nova Scotia.
Peaſe

It is well for the half-ſtarved inhabitants if they poſſeſs all theſe fine things; but *we*, I doubt, have nothing either to fear, or to hope from their agriculture.

Ships and Ship-building.

If Great Britain, in addition to eſtabliſhing the Nova Scotians as *traders* and *fiſhermen*, ſhould encourage *ſhipwrights* and *ſhip-building* among them, there is very little other foundation neceſſary towards their becoming a completely *independent* and (in due time) a reſpectable *naval power*.

Of the whole preceding liſt, therefore, it appears that *wood* and *wood aſhes* are the *only ones* which can be aſſured from Nova Scotia to this kingdom, as *proper ſtaples* to *exchange for its manufactures*;

* Page 120.

all the reſt more or leſs interfere with *its own* native *ſtaples*, and in proportion as they may riſe into importance in the colony, cannot fail of becoming pernicious to the *national* intereſt.

The article of their FISHERY

deſerves a ſeparate conſideration:—and ſurely nothing can more militate againſt the *principles* laid down in ſome parts of the noble Author's book, than his endeavours, in other parts of it, to call forth the *national patronage*, for eſtabliſhing thoſe colonies in ſecure local poſſeſſion of the *fineſt nurſery* upon the globe for *ſeamen*.

That the *Nova Scotians* "are *ſo advan-* "*tageouſly* ſituated, by their *vicinity* to "the *banks*, that they can make *ſeven* "trips to that of Newfoundland, while a "veſſel from our ports of *Poole* or *Dart-* "*mouth* can make but *one:*"—"That "*mackarel-fiſhing* is a conſiderable buſineſs "on the coaſt of *Nova Scotia:*"—"That "the *whale-fiſhery* can be carried on to "more advantage from the coaſt of *Nova* "*Scotia*, *Canada*, and *St. John's*, than "from

" from *any other* place:"—" That their " *harbours* are *ſtored* with *cod:*"—and, " That their *ſalmon-fiſhery* is unqueſtion- " ably the *beſt in the world.*"—To ſay, " That the *encouragement* there will *now* " be for *ſhip-building* in *Nova Scotia, St.* " *John's,* and *Canada* for their *coaſting* " *trade* and *fiſheries,* will draw *ſhipwrights* " thither and *ſailors* from New England " (and *from Old England* too may be add- " ed) and will *raiſe many* in our (aforeſaid) " remaining colonies; and *theſe provinces* " will become a *conſiderable nurſery for* " *ſeamen* *:"—and, " That *ſhips* may be " *built* in *Nova Scotia* to *as much* advan- " tage as in *New England,* and *as good:*"—What does all this go to prove, but that we are ſeized with a new fit of inſanity, and raging to colonize *another New England* as faſt as we can?—with *this only difference,* that our bantling of the *preſent* day has infinitely greater local advantages in point of its *fiſhery*; and may,

* He ſays (p. 88.) " That the *colony ſailors* were of " little more uſe to us than the *Dutch.*"——Does not this appear an admirable reaſon for raiſing a freſh breed of *colony ſailors?*

upon

upon that baſis, more rapidly acquire the means of *rivalling* the *Britiſh trade* and *navigation*.

I would be glad to know whether this be not the very fitteſt ſyſtem of policy for rendering *theſe northern ſettlements* more expeditiouſly *independent?* and whether, in proportion as this ſyſtem ſhall be purſued with energy, and continued *on our part*, we ſhall not have to regret, every year as we further advance, our *decreaſing* power of retrieving the miſtake?—What benefit is *this kingdom* to reap from the *marine nurſery* of *Canada* and *Nova Scotia*, in the hour of danger? The noble author tells us (p. 197.) "That *America never* furniſhed "*us* with *any American-born ſailors*."—But we do not only not gain any ſeamen, but are ſure to loſe many; for it was the complaint of a very intelligent writer, above forty years ago, that not one Britiſh ſhip in a thouſand, whether man of war or merchantman, brings home near the number of hands from *North America* that ſhe carries out. "I do not mean," ſays this writer, "ſuch ſailors as die in thoſe pro-"vinces; but ſuch as leave our ſhips, and

"*ſettle*

"*ſettle there*: and, according to the beſt "obſervation, *at leaſt one ſeaman in ten* "*ſtays there**."

I think it would be waſte of words to reaſon further upon the fatality of theſe projects. "*Nothing*," ſays the noble Author, "will preſerve the *dependance* of "thoſe countries, in a *future* ſtage of "ſettlement, *but* their *own will* and *con-* "*ſent*:"—a very flimſy thread truly!—They will continue ſubjects of Great Britain, and ſubmit to the regulations and reſtrictions of Britiſh laws, juſt as long as it may ſuit their intereſt, their convenience, and their will and pleaſure, and *no longer*. It would be idle, indeed, to ſuppoſe, that their *loyal* attachments will paſs by inheritance. —But it is in the womb of *time* to diſcover whether they will patiently continue, and *how long*, to renounce the free, unreſtricted enjoyment of almoſt the *only advantage* preſented to them by nature; or whether their ſelf-intereſt, combining with the force of ancient habits and connection with the other parts of the con-

* Popular Prejudices againſt the Convention with Spain.—1739.

tinent—

tinent—the love of change—a due increaſe of numbers — and a favourable opportunity,—may not prevail on them to add *another* ſtripe to the *American flag*.

Before I conclude, I cannot forbear taking ſome little notice of that ſplenetic language, which the noble Author applies to our Weſt India poſſeſſions, and to the perſons belonging to them, whenever they fall in his way. Whether we are to aſcribe this petulance to the noble Author's expectation, that his favourite children of the polar regions may riſe the higher in public eſteem by his depreciating and degrading thoſe of the *weſt*, is uncertain. If *this* be the motive, we may ſafely leave it to do its worſt. But there are ſome extraordinary poſitions and ſtrictures thrown out, which ought not to be entirely paſſed by in ſilence.

Firſt, with regard to the iſlands themſelves, he aſſerts (p. 260.) " There is " nothing to be *complained of more* than " the *prodigious ſums* which have been " *ſpent* in *forming ſugar plantations*, when " they might have been ſo much *better* " employed *at home*." We may aſk, What

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ſums of money have, at any time, been ſpent by the public of this country, in forming ſugar plantations? and we ſhall be anſwered, *Not one farthing*. Our ſugar plantations were formed by means of Britiſh manufactures, not by means of Britiſh money. The perſons, therefore, meant by the noble Author, who may be moſt entitled to complain, are ſurely the preſent proprietors; if they ſhould be reduced to ſuch an alternative, as that they can neither carry on their buſineſs *without loſs*, nor relinquiſh it *without ruin* to their families.

"The expence of *defending* the Weſt "India iſlands by *ſea alone*, during the "laſt war, coſt Britain a *larger ſum* than "would purchaſe the *fee ſimple* of thoſe "iſlands*." This, it may be alleged, is valuing their *fee ſimple* at a very *low* rate, or the charge of defence at a very *high* one; eſpecially if we add the diſtinct charges incurred by the inhabitants themſelves for their protection. What *France* thought *worth* the expence of endeavouring to acquire, was not improbably worth

* Page 260.

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the *Britiſh* expence of endeavouring not to loſe: the coſt of *attack* was at leaſt equal to the coſt of defence. But let the noble Author, with *equal candour*, appreciate the defence of *Gibraltar* and *Canada*, and liquidate the charges by the *fee ſimple* value of thoſe places.

"But the *detention* of our fleet in the "*Weſt Indies* was a *principal* cauſe of the "*loſs of America.*" So it ſeems, then, that our *Weſt India* iſlands are to be blamed for the *loſs of America!*—Will the noble Author's *candour* admit, that a combined enemy, in poſſeſſion of a ſuperiority of force for attack, is at liberty to chooſe his ground?—Is not the *inferior* obliged to attend upon the motions of the *ſuperior?*—And would not that ſuperiority have been as deciſive in the *Cheſapeak* as in the *Weſt Indies?*—Our Weſt India iſlands neither provoked the war, nor are anſwerable for the conduct or the conſequences of it.

But "the iron of Ruſſia, the *tobacco*, "*rice, naval ſtores, &c.* of the ſouthern "American provinces, are all *more bene-* "*ficial* to us than the *Weſt India* products."

" ducts." For " the *latter* are *luxuries* " moſtly conſumed within ourſelves:— " but the *others* are neceſſary to our na- " vigation and manufactures; furniſhing " the means of further profitable trade to " other parts,—affording advantage *when* " *taken in return, inſtead of money*,—em- " ploying our ſhipping,—paying freight, " commiſſion, &c.—and ſupplying con- " ſiderable part of the trade to Holland, " Flanders, &c." — Now granting that *ſugar* (like *clothing* in a *hot* climate, and many other things which men may abſtain from if they pleaſe, and ſuffer no violent inconveniency from the want of them) is a *luxury*, and that *tobacco* and *rice* are *neceſſaries of life*, let us aſk, Is the import of *near three millions* in value, obtained with our *manufactures* and *native commodities* principally, and retained in the national ſtock, inſtead of purchaſing that import from *France*, *Holland*, or *Portugal*, with our *ſpecie* — is the export of *near half a million more*, in theſe manufactures and commodities, to *Africa*—is the *re-export* of the ſuperfluity, to the amount of ſix hundred thouſand pounds value, to foreign

reign ſtates, Holland, Germany, and the Baltic, in return, inſtead of money — is the outfit and employment of about 700 ſail of large ſhips, beſides ſmaller ones, and above 9000 Britiſh ſeamen — are all theſe, and many more which might be named, neither abſolutely neceſſary to our navigation nor manufactures, nor affording equivalent advantages to *Great Britain?*

Tobacco, as a ſtaple *employing ſailors*, is doubtleſs equal to any; and *rice*, perhaps, not inferior. But, abſtracted from the conſideration that the former ought to and might be made a ſtaple in ſome of our *Weſt India* iſlands, they are neither of them to be compared one moment with the rich productions of thoſe iſlands, in reſpect to the general beneficial operation reſulting from them, to *Britiſh agriculture*, *manufactures*, *arts*, *trade*, and *navigation*.—"The *ſame revenue* would ariſe, "if their articles of product came to us "through the *Dutch*, *Danes*, or *French*;" and as to the *duties*, "they fall *almoſt* "*entirely* on the *conſumer* *."

* Page 153.

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Can any man be ſo abſorbed in his own theories, as not to ſee that our preſent mode of ſupplying ourſelves with ſugar, by exchanging our own native commodities and manufactures for it, is the only cauſe why we can afford to give a good price for it, or to conſume it largely? If *caſh* went out of the kingdom to bring in this article, ſuch a trade could not exiſt long without becoming ruinous to the nation. The quantity of import muſt and would be leſſened; this would *raiſe* the price to the conſumer; *leſs* would be *conſumed*, and the *revenue would fail*. The *foreign* powers, who might then ſupply it, would impoſe it upon us, with the *whole of their internal duty* involved in the price; and thus we ſhould become tributary to *foreign revenues*.

Again, let us ſuppoſe this ſugar to be brought into the kingdom by means of *money*, and *not* by commodities and manufactures: the manufactures and commodities, which ought to have gone out of the kingdom to purchaſe it, *remain* here ſtill upon hand: the native grower, manufacturer, and mechanic, find they will not any longer paſs current in barter for

this *luxury*; and they are conſtrained to the neceſſity of forbearing the uſe of it entirely. Whence, then, is the *ſame revenue* to ariſe?—from an article no longer conſumed?

"But the *duties* fall upon the *conſumer*." There is no problem in Euclid clearer than, that *increaſing* the *price* of *ſugar* by *taxes*, *muſt diminiſh* the *conſumption* of it; —that, if the conſumption decreaſes, the *price muſt fall*;—and that, if the price falls below a certain point, the burthen of the *tax* which has cauſed that reduction, *muſt reſt* upon the *planter*. If it were poſſible that the price could not fall, but was fixed by *act of parliament*, at a certain invariable rate *per Cwt.* ſtill the planter, and thoſe who might *not* conſume it, as well as thoſe who do, *muſt bear* a proportion, and a very conſiderable proportion, of the *tax* with the reſt: for the price of no one article of conſumption that can be named, can be advanced much, and continue ſo, without occaſioning a *proportionable riſe in every other conſumable article*. In the latter caſe, the planter bears only a ſhare, but in the former the whole load of

of the tax, beſides the common ſhare of its effects. Sugar is no ſooner landed *here*, than (as the collection is now managed) the whole amount of this tax is taken out of the planter's pocket, months before he can have a chance of bringing his goods to an equitable ſale. Nothing can throw a greater damp upon any commodity than this;—it is levying a *penalty* upon him for the crime of bringing it here; and impelling him either to precipitate a ſale at a great loſs, or to aggravate the penalty upon himſelf, by borrowing money at the higheſt rate of intereſt to pay it.

"* *Bad management*, or *extravagance* "chiefly, can prevent *our* iſlands from "ſelling as *cheap* as the *French*."—When the noble Author ſhall think meet to indulge his future ſpeculations upon this topic, he may enquire, if he pleaſes, how it comes to paſs, that the relative quality of the ſoil at St. Domingo is more productive than the ſoil of Jamaica? How it happens, that cloathing, ſubſiſtence, and the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life in general, are *cheaper* in *France* than in *Britain*? Let him remove

* Page 168.

the Britiſh planters from Jamaica, and ſuffer the French planters of St. Domingo to occupy their place: if the latter, now become Britiſh planters, ſhould be able to make ſugar in Jamaica (for this market) at a price *leſs by* 25 *per cent.* and contrive to *underſell all other nations*, we ſhall have better reaſon to condemn the preſent race of Britiſh planters for *bad management*.

But, "the *expenſive manner* in which "*our planters live*, cannot be accommo- "dated to *ſmall profit*."—We muſt intreat the noble Author to conſider, that if the culture of *ſugar* were attended with *ſmall profit*, or *no profit* at all, it would very ſoon be laid aſide, not only in the Britiſh colonies, but every other in the Weſt Indies. The noble Author has ſeen in England a few (and but a few) out of a numerous claſs of men. In what manner thoſe abroad *live*, he might better underſtand than he ſeems to do, by going among them; and I am perſuaded it would moſt effectually change his opinion, ſo far as it concerns our *tranſatlantic* brethren.

As to the few, whoſe infelicity it has

* Page 160.

been to paſs under his cenſorial cognizance *here*, it may very well be demanded of the noble Author, what he means by *expenſive manner of living?* Does he mean that they live above their incomes? Does *he* take upon him to limit and preſcribe how much, or how little, it *becomes them* to ſpend? Is the public at large leſs benefited by what they expend, than by what they lay up? Is there any expence in the manner of living of *this* claſs of ſubjects, that particularly marks and diſtinguiſhes *them* from all others reſident in this kingdom? Are *they* ſingularly to be noticed for diſſipating their fortunes at Newmarket, or in gambling, or on elections, or hounds, or kept miſtreſſes, or foreign tours? If parſimony be a virtue, it may be their misfortune, that they are not bleſt with ſo much of it as others may boaſt: but no ſound politician will conſider it as a misfortune to the ſtate, that (be their *manner of living* what it may) they refund into the national boſom *all* the treaſure which they have drawn out of it. * *Men* who, by hazardous labours carried on in a ſultry climate, have contributed to the *public*

* Abbé Raynal, vol. vi.

proſperity, ought to be indulged in the liberty of enjoying their wealth *without envy*, and of ending their days *without reproach*, in the temperate region of the mother country. Nothing can more effectually rouſe the ambition and activity of numbers of *idle* people, than to be the ſpectators of *their* fortune.

† The *Coloniſts* have at *all* times had "*too much credit*; they have been *in every* "*age* greatly *indebted*; and it ſeems to "have been a *favourite principle with* "*them, to prevent or retard the recovery* "*of debts*."—It is needleſs at preſent to enter into diſquiſition as to the good or evil which may have reſulted from extenſive *credit*. The neceſſity, on one ſide, for the aid of monied capital, and the proſpect of high intereſt and profits on the other, have accommodated this matter, between the planter and the merchant, to *their* mutual advantage, and to the *enrichment of the nation*.

It is the concluding poſition of the noble Author which moſt attracts remark, and which, coupled with another paſſage (hereafter to be cited) conveys ſuch a

† Page 241.

charge

charge of *profligacy* againſt the *Britiſh Coloniſts*, that it is aſtoniſhing any perſon of rank in this kingdom ſhould publicly hazard it.

Upon whoſe ſuggeſtion (for I am ſure ſuch ſentiments are not the noble Author's own) upon *whoſe illiberal* ſuggeſtion is it further inſinuated, "That, if the North "American ſtates are permitted to become "the carriers between the continent and "the iſlands, a very favourable opportu-"nity will be afforded, to ſuch of the "*planters* as may wiſh to *evade the pay-*"*ment of their debts* to *this country*, when "they find it *more convenient* to apply their "crops to *other* purpoſes, and *ſell a part*, "or the *whole*, to *North American mer-*"*chants*. That the *planter* may *ſafely* "apply the money to diſcharge his en-"gagements in the iſlands, in purchaſing "ſlaves to improve and extend his eſtate, "*&c. &c.* whilſt *his Britiſh creditor* may "be put off from time to time?"

Upon what authority is it, that the noble Author (who has probably *no* connection whatever himſelf with the Weſt Indies, either as a *merchant* or a *creditor*) adopts ſuſpicions, and diſſeminates reflections

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tions of this invidious nature, which do not appear to be entertained by the *Britiſh merchants themſelves?* Have not the majority of our Weſt India merchants in this metropolis, gentlemen of the *higheſt eminence*, and *firſt characters* in their line, *repeatedly* joined in repreſentations to government, "That our *ſugar colonies cannot* "ſubſiſt in any degree of *proſperity*, with-"out ſupplies of *lumber* and *proviſions* "*from North America*, obtained at the "*cheapeſt* rate, or without the conſump-"tion, *in North America*, of their *produce* "in return. And, that the permiſſion of "*American veſſels, as heretofore*, freely *to* "*bring* the produce of the *United States* "*to* our colonies, and *take back our produce* "*in return*, is too obviouſly eſſential, to "require any proof by argument?" The merchants, who thus *publicly* delivered their genuine ſentiments to govenment, *are creditors* of the Britiſh Weſt India iſlands to a very conſiderable amount; and there is juſt reaſon to believe, that they apprehend infinitely *more miſchief* to their *property*, from the noble Author's viſionary projects, (if they could be carried into execution) and the excluſion of American neceſſaries

neceſſaries from thoſe iſlands, than from the *imputed diſhoneſty* of our *planters reſiding* there.

Theſe ſober and well-conſidered remonſtrances from the Weſt India planters and merchants, (for the inhabitants of *every one* of thoſe iſlands ſpeak the *ſame* ſentiments upon this queſtion) the noble Author politely terms "the *intereſted clamours* "*of a few individuals.*" I do not remember any queſtion upon which the Weſt India planters and merchants, both at home and abroad, have been more unanimous: but projectors cannot brook contradiction; and it is in the ſame ſpirit of intolerance that the noble Author goes on to diſcharge his acrimony upon ſome of the governors of thoſe iſlands. "With ſo little reſpect," ſays he, "has the *navigation act* lately "met, that although all governors of our "colonies are *particularly ſworn* to en- "force it, yet *ſome* of the governors of the "Weſt India iſlands have even *boaſted* of "*diſpenſing* with *that act*, in *favour* of the "*Americans*, ſubſequent to the peace; "which no king of England, or miniſter, "ſince the Revolution, has ventured to "do."—I muſt confeſs, it does not occur

to

to me, which of the governors in particular is here meant to be ſtigmatized; but if the preſent governor of Jamaica (as there is reaſon to ſuppoſe, from a ſneer in the advertiſement to the *new edition*, p. 9.) is one of the noble Author's black-ſheep, I will venture to contend, that there breathes not in this kingdom a worthier man, a better ſubject, or a more diligent officer, than that gentleman: a brief explanation of his conduct, will be ſufficient to ſhew, that it has been perfectly irreproachable.

Hoſtilities no ſooner terminated in the Weſt Indies, than the *free-port law* revived in full force: in virtue of this law, ſeveral ports in the iſland of *Jamaica* were *legally* open to *foreign* ſhipping. Could the king's officer (*no* prohibition *then* appearing) heſitate to admit *American* veſſels upon the *ſame* footing as any *other foreigners*, ſubject to the regulations of that law? Nay, could he ſuppoſe himſelf warrantable, in *refuſing* them admittance, with ſuch an unrepealed act of parliament in his hands, to authorize that admittance? It would appear, among perſons of reaſon and humanity, a very fair vindi-

cation of any governor, who, when the ſubjects under his protection were abſolutely in danger of *famine*, had even gone ſo far as to permit the cargoes of proviſion brought for their relief to be landed and diſtributed, notwithſtanding any political ordinance to the contrary; for the *ſalus populi* is ſuperior to every political ordinance: and if he had ſworn to enforce the act of navigation, he had *alſo ſworn* to protect and ſecure the lives and properties of the king's ſubjects committed to his charge: and ſurely the latter obligation was in conſcience prior to every other. This remark, however, does not apply ſo ſtrongly to Jamaica, as to ſome of the other iſlands: there was in Jamaica a great ſcarcity of flour and other neceſſaries, but not ſo extreme as in ſome of the others.

Now, what happened in the ſequel? At length the *proclamation* arrived, prohibiting the entry of *American* veſſels;—but unaccompanied by the *act of parliament* upon which it originated;—the governor immediately cauſes all that were then in port to depart, without landing their cargoes; and *enforces* the *proclamation ſtrictly*, notwithſtanding

notwithſtanding every remonſtrance of the inhabitants, who had conceived an idea that the proclamation was ſuperſeded by the *free-port law*, and therefore, that the *American* traders were equally admiſſible as any other foreigners.

If then, in the whole of this buſineſs, there is not any one thing wherein the governor can with juſtice be criminated for a breach of his *oath* and *duty*, under the *navigation act*, and I muſt own, that I can diſcover nothing of that ſort, (except his inability, at four thouſand miles diſtance, to ſee what was in tranſaction at *Weſtminſter*, be a crime) it is to be hoped the noble Author will be pleaſed to retract the charge, ſo far at leaſt as it concerns the governor of Jamaica. But, in regard to the *planters*, he cannot render them manlier or completer juſtice, than by *publicly* diſcloſing the VOUCHERS for every malevolent inſinuation he has thought proper to throw out, tending to vilify *their credit* and *character*, in the *public* judgment.

FINIS.